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ABSTRACT:  Brazil is frequently portrayed as exhibiting persistent and structural economic 
inequality that is rooted in the early colonial experience, and is believed to undermine 
development in the long run.  I construct original measures of agricultural inequality for 1905 in 
what is today Brazil’s largest state, using farm-level micro data for some 50,000 farms. Using 
these measures of inequality, along with contemporary covariates and other historical variables I 
assess the impact of colonial institutions, slavery, farm inequality, and political inequality on 
long-term development in São Paulo.  The principal findings are: (1) a potentially coercive 
colonial institution, the aldeamento, is positively correlated with income per capita at the end of 
the twentieth century;  (2) measures of the intensity of slavery have little if any independent 
impact on income in 2000; (3) farm inequality was not persistent in São Paulo at the county level 
over the twentieth century;  (4) in both OLS and IV estimates, no negative effect can be found 
for 1905 inequality on long-term development; (5) political inequality in the early twentieth 
century, measured by the extent of the franchise, is unrelated to contemporary farm inequality, 
and also unrelated to long-term economic growth; and (6) the provision of local public goods in 
the early twentieth century, measured by local public education outlays, has a positive impact on 
long-term development, but was not related to contemporary economic or political inequality.  
Overall, neither the intensity of slavery nor the pattern of inequality had any discernable negative 
economic impact in the long run.     
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Work on growth and development over the last twenty years has increasingly focused on two 
historical features of economies: institutions, and inequality.  While cross-country evidence on 
institutional characteristics and inequality for recent decades is abundant, the supply of 
authentically historical evidence beyond anecdotes is far more scarce.  This paper examines the 
impact of colonial institutions, slavery, and inequality on long-term developmental outcomes at 
the county level for the state of São Paulo, Brazil.  The argument of the paper runs in the 
following terms.  São Paulo had colonial deep colonial origins, and was the third largest slave-
holding province in Brazil by the late nineteenth century.  Moreover, by the start of the twentieth 
century it exhibited the high levels of farm inequality and political exclusion that one would 
expect, given its legacy of colonialism, slave-based plantation agriculture, and oligarchic 
politics.  Yet one colonial institution in particular, the aldeamento--which presented a mix of 
extractive (negative) and settler (positive) characteristics-- is positively correlated with income 
per capita at the end of the twentieth century.  Slavery had tremendously negative implications 
for those who were enslaved, but the consequences of slavery for long-term development are not 
so clear cut.  Measures of the intensity of slavery have little if any independent impact on 
county-level income in 2000.  Farm inequality was high at the start of the twentieth century, yet 
the pattern of farm inequality was not persistent at the county level over the next 90 years.  
Moreover, in both OLS and IV estimates it is difficult to locate a negative effect for early 
twentieth-century inequality on long-term development.  Political inequality in the early 
twentieth century, measured by the extent of the franchise, is also unrelated to long-term 
economic growth.  Local public goods provision in the early twentieth century, measured by 
local public education outlays, is positively related to long-term development, but not correlated 
with contemporary inequality. Overall, neither the intensity of slavery nor the pattern of farm 
inequality in São Paulo had any discernable negative impact in the long run.     
 
The 1990s saw an outpouring of studies on the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth (key overviews of the this work include Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; 
Benabou, 1996).  The upending of the old view that inequality was a necessary condition of 
successful modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1955; Lewis, 1954) has spawned a vast literature 
on inequality and development.  Theoretical and empirical studies alike have shown how 
inequality can damage the prospects for growth, by facilitating demands for efficiency-
undermining redistribution, reducing the provision of public goods, suppressing the formation of 
human capital, or fostering political institutions and policies that support rent-seeking by a 
narrow elite.  Several studies showed how inequality led to redistributive policies that worked 
against growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).  Inequality in the 
presence of imperfect credit markets can lower growth by reducing human capital formation 
(Galor and Zeira, 1993; Perotti, 1996; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath; 2009).  Rich elites may repress 
democracy to secure their rents and privileges (see for example, Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; 
Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003). 
 
Whether the purported relationship between inequality and underdevelopment holds empirically 
has been another area of research.  Initial results linking inequality to poor economic growth 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 
1996) have been called into question by the findings of others (Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2003).  In particular, Forbes (2000) discovered a positive relationship 
between inequality and growth, much in the same vein as the early development literature.  Yet 
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more recently, Easterly’s investigation (2007) found a strong and credibly causal negative 
relationship between inequality and growth, reaffirming on a different basis the findings of the 
early 1990s.   
 
The debate over the role of inequality intersects the larger body of work on the determinants of 
growth.  Both literatures have taken a decidedly historical turn (though historical work on growth 
has longstanding precedents).  One prominent strand views growth as historically constrained by 
tropical latitudes and geographical conditions (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Bloom and Sachs, 
1998).  Historical institutions in the form of legal origins have been used to explain both broad 
patterns of growth, and more specifically the development of finance (LaPorta, et al., 1997; 
LaPorta, et al, 1998; Levine, 1999; Levine, 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000).  Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005) focused on an institutional mechanisms rooted in the 
early colonial era in explaining long-term differences in development.  They distinguish “settler” 
institutions from “extractive” institutions, showing that where the former prevailed the trajectory 
of development was higher.  Focusing specifically on the Americas, Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997) proposed that differing factor endowments in the 1500s led to different growth paths over 
five centuries, and that these explained current patterns of underdevelopment in the Americas.  
Easterly and Levine focused on more recent history, but also found a key role for endowments 
(Easterly and Levine, 2003).  In contrast to the original version of the Engerman and Sokoloff 
view (1997), North, Summerhill, and Weingast (2000) noted that over an interval of several 
centuries, factor endowments were effectively endogenous, and argued instead for an 
independent role for political institutions in the late colonial era and the nineteenth century in 
determining long-term economic outcomes.   In response Engerman, Sokoloff and co-authors 
refocused attention on institutions (namely slavery, the franchise, and education) that impacted 
both inequality and growth, while adhering to the argument that early factor endowments were 
the key determinant of long-term outcomes (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Engerman, Mariscal, 
and Sokoloff, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2008).  Institutions, 
whether rooted in factor endowments or not, are not universally viewed as relevant (Glaeser, et 
al., 2004).  More recently Coatsworth (2008) and Williamson (2009) have made arguments about 
inequality that, like the North, Summerhill, and Weingast view of long-term development, reject 
an early “colonial origins” explanation for patterns of inequality in Latin America.   
 
Importantly, a growing body of work has moved beyond international comparisons to look at 
variations within countries, especially with respect to institutions (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; 
Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005; Bonet and Meisel, 2006; Bruhn and Gallego, 2008).  
Huillery, 2009; Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção, 2009).  Studies that look at within-country 
variation of inequality arrive at a variety of findings.  Ramchuran (2009) found that farm 
inequality in the late nineteenth-century U.S. was an important determinant of redistributive 
transfers, including expenditures on education, as did Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009), and 
Acemoglu, et al. (2008).  Nunn (2008) found that the share of the population comprised by 
slaves in the United State in 1860 was correlated with income in 2000, but that land inequality in 
1860 was not.  Acemoglu, et al. (2008) determined that there was little role for nineteenth-
century land inequality in Colombia in explaining long-term economic outcomes, but that 
political inequality was a distinct cause of lower levels of development.  Most recently, 
Wegenast (2010), compares educational outcomes across Brazilian states, arguing for a central 
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role for endowments, crop choices and agricultural inequality in explaining lower levels of 
education. 
 
 
The Setting and Hypotheses 
 
São Paulo is the largest and richest state in Brazil.  If it were independent it would have nearly 
the third largest population of any country in Latin America, behind only the rest of Brazil, 
Mexico, and almost as large as Colombia.  Most of the state’s territory is comfortably inside the 
tropics, with a smaller portion in the “temperate” region south of the tropic of Capricorn.  Like 
the rest of Brazil, São Paulo was a colonial possession of Portugal from the start of the sixteenth 
century.  The territory of what was then a donatary captaincy was rich in land, but (from the 
perspective of the Portuguese) relatively poor in labor, and more importantly for the colonization 
project, it was poor in natural resources compared to Brazil’s northeast.  The early colonizers in 
São Paulo imposed slavery, first on the indigenous population, then using Africans (Monteiro, 
1994).  Research in the “new historical development” literature has heavily emphasized the 
importance of the colonial origins of development (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Nunn, 2008).  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 
2002) find that early European mortality risk influenced whether the colony established the 
settler institutions that promoted favorable long-term outcomes, or instead ended up with 
extractive institutions.  For Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) the factor endowments encountered 
by the Europeans determined what types of institutions were created in the colonial era, along 
with long-term patterns of inequality and development.  On the other side of the Atlantic, Nunn 
found that the African regions that were most intensively involved early on in the export of 
slaves suffered worse developmental outcomes hundreds of years after the fact (Nunn, 2008).  In 
the spirit of this literature, and employing a rich data set for Brazil, Naritomi, Soares, and 
Assunção (2009) find that extractive resource “booms” (sugar and gold) in the colonial era 
created de facto institutions that undermined development centuries later.  Across these studies 
the sources of colonial institutions differed, but all are seen as having early origins, and as 
accounting for big differences in development.    
 
Colonial Institutions in São Paulo: the Aldeamento 
 
Although São Paulo was one of the few relatively successful colonial captaincies, it lay well 
beyond the regions most affected by the first big sugar cycle in the sixteenth century (see 
Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção, 2009, Figures 5 and 6).  It was largely removed from the orbit 
of the late seventeenth-century gold boom as well.  With the mining zones as distant as a two-
months’ journey for horses and human porters (Monteiro, 1994), the gold boom from 1680 to 
1750 was unlikely to have had a long-term institutional impact in São Paulo.  São Paulo had 
always produced sugar, but its own late eighteenth-century sugar “boom” came more than a 
century and a half after the original sugar cycle involving Brazil’s northeast (Klein and Luna, 
2003).  Only with the expansion of coffee cultivation on a large scale, exploiting fertile land and 
transport improvements, in the late nineteenth century did São Paulo undergo a resource-based 
export boom. 
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If it was largely removed from the colonial extractive booms, São Paulo’s colonial origins may 
have mattered in a different way.  A subset of São Paulo’s earliest settlements, dating from the 
mid-sixteenth century, were established as aldeamentos.   Aldeamentos were settlements that the 
Portuguese created to fix the semi-nomadic indigenous population in place, convert them to 
Christianity, provide with ongoing religious instruction, and defend against less-cooperative 
raiding Indians (Petrone, 1995; Perrone-Moíses, 1992).  Aldeamentos were sanctioned by the 
crown, administered by the Jesuits, and populated with Indians.  Characterizing actual colonial 
institutions (as opposed to de facto institutions inferred ex post from regression results) is not as 
simple as much of the factor endowments-colonial origins literature suggests, and aldeamentos 
are no exception.2  What is frequently obscured in the colonial factor endowments view is that 
the pattern and intensity of colonization and settlement followed not only the profit-seeking 
motives of the colonizers , but also the fiscal goals of the crown, and a religious and spiritual 
logic emanating from Rome and running through Spain and Portugal.  In creating permanent 
sites of settlement and religious instruction for a heterogeneous mix of nomadic and semi-
nomadic indigenous peoples, the church and crown created an institution with myriad attributes.  
While designed to protect indigenous peoples from slavery, aldeamentos reduced their mobility, 
concentrating them in a few sites, and may have made them more readily exploitable by 
Europeans as a labor force.  In this sense aldeamentos were functionally part of an overall 
“extractive” effort.  Yet, much like settler institutions (in terms suggested by Acemoglu, et al.), 
aldeamentos were established with a goal of permanence by their organizers, rather than short-
term gains.  Importantly, aldeamentos were not enclaves.  European and ethnically-mixed 
settlement sprung up around aldeamentos because of the economic activities undertaken under 
the watchful eyes of the priests.   
 
One cluster of aldeamentos was located on the highland plateau, in and around what today is the 
megopolis of São Paulo.  This clustering might hint at geographic and climatic influences on the 
location of aldeamentos, yet the settlements were also found on the near-tropical coast, and well 
inland, close to the Paraiba valley.  There is no information on the radius of influence of an 
aldeamento.  In one respect it could be large, in that indigenous peoples were brought to some 
aldeamentos from considerable distances.  In other respects the area of influence might be 
limited to the actual boundaries of the aldeamento, and the boundaries of direct Jesuit control.  
The more expansive measure of influence could encompass the much larger districts of which 
each aldeamento was a part at the peak of its population in the mid seventeenth century.3  A far 
                                                 
2 The Engerman and Sokoloff thesis, as it pertained to Latin America, is very close to Lockhart 
and Schwartz’s pioneering interpretation of the pattern of colonization.  Though not shrouded in 
an economic apparatus or jargon, the Lockhart and Schwartz view strongly emphasized the 
characteristics of indigenous social organization, as well the availability of readily exploitable 
natural resources, in determining the paths of colonization and colonial development.  Lockhart 
and Schwartz’s interpretation, once recast in economic language, is by and large the factor 
endowments story. 
 
3 The indigenous populations within the aldeamentos declined after 1640, when the Jesuits were 
forcibly expelled by colonists from São Paulo because of their stance against indigenous slavery.  
The decline was exacerbated by the gold boom in Minas Gerais, which attracted laborers among 
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more restrictive measure would be the boundaries of the year 2000 county in which the 
aldeamento was located.  Here a somewhat conservative middle approach is taken: each 
aldeamento’s area of influence is taken to be the county as it was defined in 1872 that had been 
created on the basis of the aldeamento.  The hypothesis to be tested is that, if aldeamentos indeed 
had predominantly “extractive” characteristics, they should be negatively associated with long-
term economic outcomes. 
 
Colonial and Modern Institutions: African Slavery  
 
Generations of historians have long believed that slavery and the legacy it left were inimical to 
development.  Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and more recently Nunn (2008) present evidence 
that slavery had a long-term negative impact on economic growth in the Americas.  Brazil was 
the single largest importer of African slaves in the western hemisphere over a period of nearly 
three and a half centuries.  Around 1580 the Portuguese finally grasped that the indigenous 
population of Brazil was never going to provide the relatively abundant source of servile labor 
that the Spanish had encountered in meso-America and the Andes.    Few of the slaves imported 
to Brazil in the colonial era went to São Paulo, going instead to export-boom regions with high 
labor demand during the sugar, gold, and early coffee cycles.  Several centuries of efforts to 
enslave the indigenous population in São Paulo gave way by the early 1800s to a system based 
on the enslavement of Africans and their descendents.  African slavery always existed in São 
Paulo under the Portuguese, but was far more prominent in the decades before abolition in 1888 
than at any point before.  The demand for slaves in São Paulo increased sharply in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  The construction of railroads in São Paulo beginning in the late 
1860s opened the central and western parts of the state to commercial agriculture.  The spread of 
coffee cultivation beyond the Paraiba valley greatly increased the demand for farm labor.  
Because the slave trade from Africa had ended in 1850s, this demand for labor was initially met 
by imports of slaves from elsewhere in Brazil.  By 1872 ten percent of Brazil’s slave population 
was concentrated in São Paulo, and only three provinces had more slaves.  Between 1872 and the 
abolition of slavery in 1888 São Paulo had the highest rate of net internal importation of slaves 
of any province in Brazil (Slenes, 1976). When the available supply of slaves proved 
insufficient, coffee growers in São Paulo began to draw large numbers of European immigrants 
(Holloway 1980; Dean, 1976).   The Brazilian government began to gradually abolish slavery in 
1871, and in 1888 slavery ended.   The 1872 census reported the numbers of slaves in each 
county (Brazil, 1876).  This was likely near the peak of slavery in São Paulo.  Testing the 
hypothesis that slavery was inimical to development in São Paulo draws on county-level 
measures of the intensity of slavery 1872. 
 
Agricultural Inequality 
 
The inequality component of the Engerman-Sokoloff thesis resonated especially strongly with 
other investigators, since it was applicable beyond the peculiarities of slave societies.  Here the 
recent historical turn in the literature has been a sharp one.  The findings, however, are mixed.  
For the late 20th century Easterly (2007) found a strong and negative relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                             
the indigenous population (Petrone, 1995; Monteiro, 1994). The effect of the creation of the 
aldeamentos was permanent, however, as the communities that built up around them persisted. 
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income inequality and income around the world.  Frankema (2009) argues for a mix of 
institutional and factor endowments in accounting for patterns of inequality across countries.  
Ramcharan (2009); Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009); and Acemoglu, et al. (2008) all found a 
negative relationship between nineteenth-century land inequality and human capital formation 
(or educational expenditures) within the United States.  Nunn (2008), by way of contrast, found 
no significant relationship between early land inequality and long-term economic performance in 
the US at either the state or county level.  Acemoglu, et al. (2008) similarly did not find a 
negative relationship between nineteenth-century land inequality, and either income or 
education, in Cundinamarca province in Colombia.  If inequality in São Paulo undermined 
development, it should be apparent in its effects on later income and related development 
indicators.  This is the hypothesis tested below using an original set of inequality measures based 
on farm-level data for the fifty thousand farms in 1905. 
 
Data Overview 
 
Testing the hypotheses that colonial institutions, slavery, and inequality negatively impacted 
long-term development requires data on several key variables, and a variety of potential controls.  
Since farm inequality can be calculated at the county level in 1905, I focus on county-level 
political and economic indicators.  Assessments at the county level for São Paulo are 
complicated by the fact that in most cases the year 2000 counties do not correspond exactly with 
counties from 1905 and earlier periods.  The extent of this problem is revealed by Figure 1.A and 
Figure 1.B, which show the relentless division of counties over the twentieth century.  To render 
year 2000 municipalities comparable with those of 1905 required a painstaking recombination of 
nearly 650 municípios in year 2000 into 170 municípios in 1905.4   The matching of newer 
counties to their 1905 predecessors relied on a variety of sources detailing the administrative 
subdivision of counties over time.  Of the 171 counties in 1905, only one was permanently 
absorbed by another at a later point.  Maintaining comparability between the 1905 counties and 
year 2000 counties required that Santo Amaro and the capital of São Paulo be treated as a single 
composite 1905 county.  Appendix II provides detail on the matching process, along with checks 
for consistency. 
 
The 1905 inequality measures are based on farm-level census results encompassing nearly 
50,000 farms in 1904-1905.  Census results from 1904-1905 have not previously exploited at the 
micro level for the state as a whole.  While most of the census data is straightforward, the data 
for a several counties presented considerable challenges to measuring inequality.  The 
construction of the gini coefficients is detailed in the following section.  Additional detail on 
manipulations and adjustments to the farm-level data is provided in Appendix III. 
 
                                                 
4 Eustáquio Reis has pioneered in reconstructing minimal comparable areas back to 1872 for 
Brazil as a whole, thereby making it possible for investigators to use historical variables at levels 
below that of the state, despite the widespread fragmentation of counties over the last century 
and a half (Reis, Pimentel, and Alvarenga, 2010).  The approach here to developing comparable 
territorial units (CTUs) is similar, but differs in that it attempts a direct and complete matching of 
2000 and 1905 counties, and is limited to the state of São Paulo.  
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Information on the aldeamentos and their locations comes from Petrone (1995). Other variables 
and controls from the first decade of the twentieth century, and before, come mainly from 
contemporary official publications.  Variables for the late twentieth century come from standard 
official sources.  Definitions and sources for each variable are detailed in Appendix I.   
 
Agricultural Inequality in 1905 
 
One of the principal obstacles to studying the impact of past inequality has been the lack of 
comprehensive and reliable measures.  The farm census of 1905 provides farm-level details on 
land, wealth, owners, and cultivation, among other fields.  The results of this census have long 
been consulted by historians (see Camargo, 1981; Milliet, 1939; and Holloway, 1980, among 
others).  Previous work has not used it to create measures of farm inequality.  Of 171 counties 
that made up the state in 1905, the census reports farm-level details on more than 50,000 farms 
in 165 counties.  For the other six counties no detailed farm-level data have yet been located.  
Farm-level information was collected for these counties, since the distribution of farms by size 
category was reported in the annual report of the state secretary of agriculture, along with farm 
values, land-use data, and information on proprietors.5  The distribution of farms across size 
categories for these six counties provides a crude measure of inequality that is then used to 
generate estimates of the other measures.  
  
To indicate the degree of farm inequality I construct Gini coefficients for each county in 1905.  
While a variety of inequality measures are available, Ginis enjoy ease of interpretation, and are 
directly comparable with late-twentieth century measures of farm inequality.  The Gini’s are 
constructed using the standard formula: 
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The five gini coefficients are the crude farm gini, farm land gini, the overall farm land gini, the 
farm wealth gini, and the overall farm wealth gini.  For these six counties that did not report at 
the farm level, an approximation to the gini coefficient was constructed by using the midpoints 
of the each size category as the mean farm size.  This is the crude farm gini coefficient.   
 
The farm land gini and farm wealth gini consider the distribution of farm land and farm wealth 
over proprietors.  Figure 3 shows the relationship between the two definitions of inequality in 
practice.  Differences between these two measures have two obvious sources.  The first is the 
unit value of land, which varied considerably across farms within counties, and across counties.  
                                                 
5 These were the 1905 counties of Apiahy, Iquape, Mogy das Cruzes, Santa Izabel, Tieté, and 
Ytú. 
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The second is the value of non-land farm assets (implements, improvements, structures, and the 
like).  This is especially salient in the case of coffee growing.  Coffee cultivation was an 
investment problem; plantings required a three to five year wait to bear fruit, and then under 
normal circumstances yielded a crop for decades.  Farms with productive coffee groves would be 
worth substantially more than similar farms planted in annual crops. 
 
The farm land gini and farm wealth gini are the most common measures of agricultural 
inequality.  But they address distribution only across owners, and do not take into account those 
without property.  They will mask high inequality if many people do not own land.  In a 
hypothetical county of 10 equal-sized farms distributed across 10 families, and 90 more families 
who do not own, the land and value gini coefficient will indicate perfect equality among owners, 
when 90 percent of the population is in fact landless.  The overall measures are a step toward 
remedying this problem, taking into account that farms were distributed across not just farm 
owners, but the entire population (here taken as potential farm-owning families, rather than 
individuals).  The number of “landless” families in each county in 1905 is not known.  Under the 
assumption that the average family size of immigrants was roughly typical of the rural 
population, the number of landless families can be calculated from the county population and the 
number of farm owners.6 
    
For the six counties presenting data only by size categories, imputing the farm land gini 
coefficients, and the farm wealth gini coefficient, was achieved by regressing each of these 
variables separately on the crude gini coefficient.7  The crude farm gini alone was a less effective 
predictor of the overall ginis.  Since the principal distinguishing feature of the overall ginis is 
their incorporation of the landless population, the crude farm gini and the estimated share of 
landless families in the county were used together as predictors.8     
 
Table 1.A presents summary statistics for the five gini coefficients.  As expected, the overall 
ginis are considerably higher than the ginis considering only farm proprietors, given the large 
number of people who were not owners.  The inequality measures nonetheless show considerable 
dispersion, with some counties being more than fifty percent less equal than others in the 
distribution of wealth. Correlations between these measures are presented in Table 1.B.  The 
adjustments made to the farm land gini and farm value ginis to construct the overall measures of 
inequality are not simply positive monotonic transformations.  The share of the population that 
was landless varied sufficiently across counties in 1905 that the correlations between different 
ginis declines considerably between the crude farm gini, and the overall farm wealth gini. 
 
The first result on long-term inequality appears in Table 1.C.  Farm area gini coefficients are 
available for almost all counties in 1995.  I combine these 1995 county-level ginis to create farm 
area ginis for the CTUs in 1995, weighted by the share of farmland accounted for by each of the 
1995 counties within the CTU.  The result is a set of comparable farm land gini coefficients for 
                                                 
6 Holloway’s (1980) detailed work on immigrants shows that the average immigrant family size 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century was 4.7 persons.  I employ a family size of five. 
7 The overall fit of these simple regressions was excellent; details available on request.  
8 Adding the share of landless families improved the fit dramatically over the simpler 
specification using the crude farm gini coefficient alone.   
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168 of the 170 CTUs.  A comparison of the farm area ginis from 1995 and 1905 reveal that the 
average level of farm land inequality in 1995 is strikingly similar to its level in 1905, with gini 
coefficients of 0.688 and 0.677 respectively.  The fact that the degree of farm land inequality 
remains largely unchanged for nearly a century in São Paulo might be taken as support for the 
prevailing view that inequality in Brazil is both structural and persistent (Easterly, 2007).  The 
average levels of inequality in 1905 and 1995 obscure a key detail.  Agricultural inequality in 
São Paulo is high. But the state-wide average masks both considerable diversity, and change over 
time.  The correlation between inequality across counties in 1905 and 1995 is strikingly low.  
Less than ten percent of the county variation in inequality in 1995 is associated with the county 
variation in inequality in 1905.  The low correlation shows that farm land inequality in São Paulo 
was not persistent at the county level.  Such a shift in the spatial distribution of inequality across 
counties strongly suggests that farm inequality cannot be “structural,” in that it was 
predetermined by political and economic institutions established at some previous point in time.  
As the results below will demonstrate, agricultural inequality may in fact be irrelevant in 
explaining many outcomes of interest, whether in 1905 or in 2000. 
 
 
Colonialism, Slavery, Inequality and Development: Reduced-Form 
Estimates 
 
The outcome of interest is income per capita in year 2000 in each comparable territorial unit 
corresponding to a 1905 county. 9  The use of comparable territorial units permits ready 
exploitation of the 1905 inequality measures, as well as over contemporary covariates.  Several 
other factors are examined as well, including indicators of colonial heritage, and slavery.  I use 
OLS to estimate reduced-form equations of the following type: 
 
iii Iy eba +++= iγCln  
 
where lny is the natural logarithm of per capita income in 2000 for the CTU in 2000 that 
corresponds to the 1905 county; I is the variable of interest, and C is a vector of controls.  Table 
2A provides summary statistics of the variables used below, and Table 2B reports the 
correlations between key variables.  Table 3 presents regression results that reveal the extent of 
the correlation between per capita income and variables for colonial origins and slavery.  The 
simplest representation is found in the first specification.  It looks at two factors.  The first is a 
dichotomous variable that measures whether the first population center to be formally recognized 
in each county was founded before independence (1822).  This is a direct and blunt measure of 
whether local institutions were tautologically “colonial.”  The second factor is whether the 
municipality was created specifically from a colonial aldeamento.  Both parameter estimates are 
positive, but only colonial aldeamento is significant (this specification, and all that follow, use a 
robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix to accommodate heteroskedasticity in the 
errors).  Since all of the aldeamentos also date from the colonial period, this simple specification 
                                                 
9 The mean of the level of year 2000 per capita income is close to the median, yet considerably 
skewed to the right, and exhibits thick tails.  Taking the natural logarithm eliminated the 
skewness and excessive kurtosis.   
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necessarily suffers from multicolinearity.  The second specification adds the distance from the 
coast as a control, and may capture several countervailing effects.  If distance from port proxies 
the high cost of overland transport in the colonial era, and such isolation negatively impacted 
development, the coefficient should be negative.  Alternatively, if population centers founded 
earlier in the colonial era were also systematically closer to the coast, where transport costs were 
lower, founding year and distance to coast could be picking up a similar effect.  As a further 
alternative, if up-country lands were more fertile on average, and higher fertility had a durable 
impact, distance from the coast would be positively correlated with income per capita in 2000.  
In this specification the estimate on distance is positive and statistically significant, as is colonial 
founding.   
 
The third specification adds a variable for the intensity of slavery in 1872.  Each 1905 county is 
assigned the ratio of slaves-to-total population for the 1872 county of which it was part. In effect 
this measures the impact of an aggregated variable on a more “micro” variable (there were more 
counties in 1905 than in 1872), and requires cluster robust standard errors to guard against 
overstating the statistical significance of the coefficients (Moulton 1990).  The effect of slavery 
on income per capita in 2000 is positive and statistically significant.  A larger share of the 
population enslaved in 1872 is associated with higher levels of development in 2000.  Finally, 
São Paulo experienced considerable variation in the timing and type of settlement, which may 
have influenced long-term outcomes in ways not captured by the dichotomous variable for 
colonial founding.  Specification 4 takes this into account by dropping the dummy variable on 
“colonial” and adding instead a continuous variable for the founding year of the first settlement 
in the county.  In this specification the signs of the coefficients on the other variables remain 
unchanged, and all estimates are significant.  The result is negative, with an earlier founding 
associated with higher levels of income in 2000.  This result, too, is surprising, given that most 
specialists associate the emergence of modern economic growth in São Paulo with areas of more 
recent settlement.  Based on this specification, Figure 4 illustrates the partial correlation between 
colonial aldeamento and income per capita in 2000. 
 
Causality cannot be established from regressions in which several variables may be endogenous.  
The locations of aldeamentos, even those based on existing indigenous aldeias, could have been 
heavily influenced by other conditions.  Local climate, geography, and forest resources are all 
factors that could mattered both for the location of aldeamentos, and for income today.   The 
timing of the founding of settlements (aldeamentos or not) could be similarly affected by other 
preconditions.  Even distance to the coast, which is indisputably exogenous, may capture several 
distinct effects that run in opposing directions.  The OLS estimates are nonetheless striking: 
colonial founding and (and, alternately an earlier founding year) is associated with higher levels 
of year 2000 income.  If the county’s origins were in an aldeamento—the principal 
distinguishing institutional feature among colonial settlements in São Paulo--its year 2000 level 
of income per capita was higher still.  The intensity of slavery during the nineteenth-century 
coffee boom also gives the appearance of a strong and positive effect on income in 2000. 
  
What role did inequality play in long-term outcomes, once colonial conditions and slavery are 
taken into account?  The regressions in Table 4 incorporate the measures of farm inequality and 
overall inequality constructed in the preceding section.  The results are again striking.  In no 
specification does 1905 inequality have a negative impact on income in year 2000.  In the first 
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three specifications, using the crude gini, the farm land gini, and the farm wealth gini, the 
coefficients are all positive but with standard errors that are large, making them statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  The specifications using the overall gini measures, however, result 
in a significant coefficient on inequality, but one that is positive, rather than negative.   Figure 5 
shows the relationship between overall farm wealth inequality and income per capita in 2000, 
while Figure shows the same for overall farm wealth.  Using OLS, the effect of inequality is the 
opposite of the predicted one: higher inequality in 1905 is associated with better development 
outcomes in 2000. 
 
To help ensure that 1905 inequality is not merely capturing other contemporary factors that are 
positively correlated with income per capita in 2000, the specifications in Table 5 adds controls 
to a set of specifications using the overall farm wealth gini, since it is the most encompassing of 
the inequality measures.  Specification 2 adds a measure of population density in 1907.  Density 
has been found to be a remarkably reliable indicator of relative incomes, and captures several 
key economic characteristics of place (Acemoglu, et al., 2002).  The effect of density in 1907 on 
income in 2000 is strongly positive—counties that were already prosperous in the early twentieth 
century remained relatively so for the rest of the century.  Its other effect is to reduce the 
parameter estimate on slavery.  The third specification adds controls for transport conditions, all 
of which are related to greater exposure to distant markets, and--in agricultural economies--
higher rents to land and higher farm incomes.  The coefficients on all three controls—Port, River 
Navigation, and Railroad—are positive, but River Navigation is not significant.  Their inclusion 
further reduces the parameter on the slavery variable, and strips it of its last remaining statistical 
significance.  The railroad effect in particular is strong in the OLS specifications, a result 
consistent with finding in other frameworks (Summerhill, 2003; 2005).  The final specification 
removes the density variable and adds an economically more specific measure of the average 
productivity of land (gross farm product divided by the land in farms), which takes on the 
expected sign and is significant.     
 
The loss of statistical significance on the slavery variable in specifications that include 
population density and transportation facilities warrants elaboration.  Slavery in Brazil was a 
property-rights institution dating from the colonial era.  But instead of proxying for de facto 
institutions, the intensity of slavery within São Paulo in 1872 was an indicator of local 
production possibilities—i.e., endowments.  Slavery’s intrinsic long-term consequences are 
poorly captured by the distribution of the slave population in São Paulo in 1872 (or anywhere 
else in Brazil, for that matter).  Table 7 presents estimates of the relationship between income in 
2000 and the intensity of slavery at a couple of points in history for all of Brazil.  The 1872 
slavery variable is positive and significant by itself, and when late colonial population density 
and the intensity of slavery at the end of the colonial era are taken into account.  But the lion’s 
share of the variance is explained by regional inequality.  Figure 7 displays the added-variable 
plots.  Once region is controlled for, late colonial population density (an indicator of the 
economy) takes on the expected sign, as does the intensity of slavery in 1819.  The intensity of 
slavery in 1819 has a negative impact on income per capita nearly two hundred years later.10  
The intensity of slavery in 1872 has no statistically significant impact. 
                                                 
10 A cautionary note is in order:  the 1872 figures, and even the late eighteenth-century 
population data, come from primary sources that are familiar to historians.  The 1819 slavery 
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The economic changes of the nineteenth century constituted a reversal of fortune across Brazil’s 
regions.  The increasing integration of domestic markets, shifting demand abroad for goods, 
altered regional (and local) prospects for profit.  Mobile factors of production, including (or 
especially) slave labor, followed those prospects.  From the perspective of owners, slaves were 
nothing more than capitalized streams of labor services.  Slave owners moved slaves to the 
regions where the return on the investment in the slave was highest.   Those were the regions 
with the best productive possibilities based on growing conditions and distance to market.  Slave 
owners and slaves agglomerated in areas with superior agronomic endowments, which were also 
frequently along the planned or likely routes of railroads.  Those same regions of São Paulo also 
had agglomerations of free persons in the early 20th century, and the later population density was 
higher.   
 
In summary, São Paulo was wholly unexceptional within Brazil in terms of the relationship 
between slavery in 1872, and economic outcomes in 2000.  Negative consequences of the local 
intensity of slavery are hard to identify.  The intensity of slavery itself was an effect, an outcome 
of the ensemble of local and regional conditions conducive to future prosperity. 
 
 
Robustness 
 
To assess robustness I first inspect the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of counties with 
unusual characteristics.  I then conduct specification tests with respect to the functional form, and 
check for outliers.  Finally I consider another approach to estimation.  
 
One source of potential concern is the three extraordinarily large frontier counties in the west in 
1905.  These alone divided into hundreds of counties in year 2000.  There is considerable 
variation among the present-day counties that descended from these three, which is impossible to 
assess with historical variables, given that the lowest level at which we have most early 
twentieth-century variables is the year 2000 CTU matched to the “old” 1905 county.  None of 
these suggested any problems in tests of outliers and leverage.  Nonetheless, to assess the impact 
of including these large western frontier counties on the estimates, every specification reported 
here was run again, excluding these three cases.  The parameter estimates and test statistics 
proved remarkably insensitive to the exclusion of the three big western 1905 counties.  In 
general, their exclusion improved the overall fit very slightly, with nearly imperceptible changes 
in the parameter estimates.  
 
Moreover, the specification of the model underpinning the OLS results proves adequate, in light 
of the results from Ramsey’s omitted-variable specification error test.   Additionally, to gauge 
whether some observations exercised undue influence on the estimates, I computed outlier 
statistics and measures of leverage.  Using the DFITS statistic revealed 15 outlier cases overall 
(less than 10 percent of the cases here), with the number of negative outliers exceeding positive 
outliers 2 to 1.  However, the value of the two largest positive outliers (the counties of Lorena, 
                                                                                                                                                             
figure, by way of contrast, is a contemporary estimate, the basis of which is not clear.  See 
Summerhill, Origins of Economic Backwardness, ch. 4 (in progress). 
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and Sao Paulo/Santo Amaro) exceed the absolute value of the largest negative outlier by 92% 
and 64% respectively.  As in the approach taken to the three large western counties, observations 
for Lorena and Sao Paulo/Santo Amaro were dropped, and the regressions run again without the 
large positive outliers.  The key change in the results was that the estimates on farm area gini, 
and farm wealth gini, became statistically significant, yet remained strongly positive.  As a last 
test of the sensitivity to outliers, all 15 outliers were dropped, and the estimates run again (again, 
with cluster robust standard errors).  This further strengthened the results, both with respect to 
the statistical significance of the coefficients, and in terms of the overall fit and the F statistic.  
But outliers are in no way driving the result by which inequality fails to negatively correlate with 
long-term income.  Removing the outliers did not alter the general thrust of the OLS estimates--
both higher inequality, and the presence of a colonial aldeamento, were associated with higher 
levels of per capita income in 2000. 
 
Finally, one concern is that the effects of inequality and other covariates could differ across the 
(conditional) distribution of the log of per capita income in 2000.  If the parameter estimate on 
inequality is not the same across quantiles, the OLS estimates can obscure a potentially 
important relationship between inequality and development for a subset of the counties.  Quantile 
regression is more robust to outliers than OLS, and is semi-parametric, making it especially 
useful in the presence of heteroskedasticity.   I performed a quantile regression analysis using 
bootstrap standard errors, with parameters estimated at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.  The 
coefficients on inequality in fact differ across quantiles.  Yet the results of quantile estimation 
leave the qualitative findings from the OLS results unchanged.  In particular, the sign on farm 
wealth inequality remains positive.   
 
In the following subsections I return to the OLS setting, and employ additional economic 
controls to better ensure that the true effect of inequality on long-term income is not negative.  I 
further incorporate a new set of variables that indicate at least partially the degree of political 
inequality.  I finally consider alternative outcome variables, to check if the effects identified here 
are simply a result of using per capita income in 2000 as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Other economic controls: early twentieth-century agriculture 
 
Crop mix is often associated with long-term effects, particularly if there is some sort of lock-in 
based on crop choice.  The weakness of crop-mix variables (and output-mix variables) is that 
they are endogenous not only to “endowments” but also innovations, such as transport 
improvements.  Crop choices thus reflect a number of features, including climate, geography, 
and access to market.  The advantage of Easterly’s (2007) instrumental variable on the suitability 
of land for wheat vs. sugar becomes clear, since it moves away from actual plantings to address 
potentials, better isolating endowments.  Here, three approaches were taken to testing for the 
effect of crop mix (the results are suppressed in the interest of space).  The first tack included the 
share of cultivated land in coffee in 1905, along with the shares of land in other major crops in 
the regression on year 2000 income.  The parameter estimate on the share of cultivated land in 
coffee was positive and significant.  This suggests that a durable effect from coffee cultivation 
that may have locked in patterns of labor relations for several decades, even if coffee was no 
longer the principal activity of municípios in 2000.  The second approach uses the share of crop 
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output in gross farm product (including extractive and livestock).  Areas reliant on livestock and 
forestry have lower outputs per unit of land, and may exhibit poorer long term growth.  Here, 
however, there was no effect.  The third approach goes beyond the distinction between coffee 
and non-coffee.  Output figures by county and crop are available for 1905 and 1906.11  They 
must be used with caution, since they fail in some cases to report information on locally 
idiosyncratic crops.  This is less of a problem for inland counties.  But to illustrate the nature of 
the measurement error that can arise, the farms in the county of São Vicente produced mainly 
bananas, oranges, and manioc.  The last three products are not included in the state-level crop 
production figures for 1905, and do not enter in the measures for either the value of agricultural 
output or gross farm product for any year.  Similarly, the county-wide aggregates for Conceição 
de Itanhaem show mainly some small amounts of rice and beans in the 1906 crop as the county’s 
food production.  Yet the farm-level census from 1905 indicates every farm in the county 
engaged principally in manioc cultivation, a non-reported category in crop output in 1906. Some 
measurement bias is inevitable, but the cases like these counties are few overall.  Importantly, the 
share of coffee in total crop output in 1905 was found to figure positively and strongly in year 
2000 per capita income, while the shares of rice and beans in particular are negatively correlated 
with year 2000 income. These effects come in addition to the market-exposure effect of having a 
railroad, and likely reflect specific features of the agronomic endowment, a feature addressed in 
more detail in the IV estimates below.   
 
 
Other economic controls: industry, banking, immigration, and local public goods 
 
 
Table 6 presents further results from alternative specifications that incorporate other economic 
variables.  These controls are of particular interest because they either capture key features of the 
São Paulo economy in this period, or have otherwise been singled out for their potential to foster 
growth.   
 
Most of São Paulo’s counties were overwhelmingly agricultural in 1905.   Brazilian 
manufacturing was still concentrated in the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.   Nonetheless, 
pockets of consumer industry had already appeared across São Paulo, which at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was on its way to becoming Brazil’s principal industrial center (Dean, 
1969; Cano, 1997).  It is well known that manufacturing can exhibit agglomeration economies 
that prove highly durable over long periods of time.  To test the hypothesis that early location of 
industry in the state of São Paulo mattered for year 2000 income, and might offset the inequality 
variable (especially in counties with more manufacturing), Specification 1 of Table 6 adds a 
                                                 
11 Every county except Amparo reported its crop output in 1906.  For Amparo, physical outputs 
from 1905 are used instead, and are valued and aggregated using the product prices for 1906 
from its largest neighboring county. 
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variable for industrial capital per capita in 1907.12  The parameter estimate has the "correct" sign, 
but lacks both statistical and economic significance.   
 
Beyond industry, banking may have played a role both in the level of economic activity in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, and in the long run.  Banking in the state was concentrated 
heavily in the city of São Paulo, but there were local banks based in other counties as well.  
Proximity to a bank may have made access to credit easier for farmers, either because it lowered 
monitoring costs for the lender, or even because insider connections were important in gaining 
access to capital.  The second specification adds banking assets per capita.  The coefficient has 
the right sign, and proves to be both statistically (and economically) significant.   
 
The third leg of the tripod underpinning São Paulo’s rapid growth, beyond railroads and coffee, 
was immigration.  Brazil was second only to the United States and Argentina in the number of 
immigrants it received in this period.  Within Brazil São Paulo was the single most important 
destination of immigrants.  Holloway (1980) in particular highlighted the possibilities for upward 
mobility that São Paulo agriculture offered to immigrants.  The county’s share of Brazilian-born 
farmers in 1905 had strongly negative effect on income in 2000.  This effect was robust to 
variety of other controls not reported here, including measures of the partial productivity of land 
and coffee trees.  Counties with more immigrant farm owners had systematically better long-
term outcomes. 
 
 Most importantly, the coefficient on inequality (Overall Farm Wealth Gini) remained positive 
and significant irrespective of the controls.  Inequality in 1905 had no detectable deleterious 
effects on income in 2000. 
 
Inequality and Other Outcomes 
 
Long-term outcomes 
 
For some investigators income per capita remains the best overall long-term indicator of human 
well being.  A growing number of scholars, however, view income alone as far too narrow of a 
measure.  Lest there be suspicion that the results thus far are some fluke of using income per 
capita as the outcome variable, Table 9 presents OLS results on a variety of other measures of 
development.  The first three specifications drop income per capita as the dependent variable, 
and use instead Human Development Indices (HDI) for income, education, and longevity.  
Despite the appealing reference to “development” in the name, HDIs are little more than gussied-
up indices of gross domestic product per capita, literacy and schooling, and average life 
expectancy (and the overall HDI, not used here, is nothing more than a simple average of the 
indices for the three component HDIs).  The fourth specification in the table uses a related 
measure, the IDFM, a composite index of employment, health, and education at the municipal 
level.  Specifications 5 and 6 are proxies for human capital, and together are related to the HDI 
for Education in Specification 2.  Specification 5 uses the average years of schooling completed 
                                                 
12 Contemporaries and later observers noted that the 1907 manufacturing census fell short of a 
full count.  Nonetheless, a careful comparison of the textile firms enumerated in 1907 with those 
of the textile census in 1905 shows that the 1907 survey was far more complete in São Paulo. 
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by adults, and Specification 6 employs the literacy rate for people 15 years of age and above.  
Finally, Specification 7 uses an index of Physicians per capita in year 2000.  As with income per 
capita, these variables are combined into 1905 CTUs using population shares of year 2000 
counties.    
 
Of the seven specifications with different outcome variables, in no instance are higher levels of 
inequality in 1905 are associated with lower levels of income in 2000.  In most cases 1905 farm 
inequality is both positive and statistically significant.   The results are sensitive to the use of 
other definitions of the inequality variable; for most specifications the parameter estimate on 
inequality becomes statistically insignificant using other ginis.  In some instances it actually 
turns negative, taking on the “expected” sign, but never at levels of significance that are 
conventionally acceptable.  Using alternative indicators of development, and differing measures 
of inequality, not a single result showed farm inequality in 1905 to be significantly and 
negatively related to outcomes in 2000. 
 
Contemporary outcomes 
 
The reduced form relationship between inequality and contemporary outcomes can be readily 
checked.  Table 10 looks at inequality and three variables taken as indicative of the level of 
development in 1905: infant mortality, farm output per capita, and local public expenditures per 
capita on education.  It is noteworthy that the impact of colonial aldeamentos turns negative for 
two of these outcomes.  To the extent that the aldeamento variable by 1905 proxied higher levels 
of urbanization, it could easily be correlated with lower agricultural output per capita (as in 
Specification 2).  Its correlation lower local expenditures on education (Specification 3) quite 
likely stems from the fact that in places with higher populations the state government, rather than 
local governments, was the primary provider of primary schooling.   
 
A more extensive treatment of the determinants of infant mortality is in preparation, but 
Specification 1 reports correlations in a simple setting.  It shows the expected positive 
relationship between infant mortality rates in the first decade of the twentieth century and 
inequality, but without statistical significance.  Stripping out the covariates (not reported here) 
does not change the relationship, and the direct correlation between infant mortality and all the 
gini coefficients is very low.  Infant mortality in the first decade of the twentieth century is better 
explained by land productivity (with higher productivity lowering mortality), the time since 
settlement, and the non-immigrant share of farm owners.   
 
In the second specification higher inequality is associated with lower farm output per capita, but 
in light of the standard errors the inequality effect is once again effectively nil.  Per capita 
agricultural productivity in 1905 is, unsurprisingly, correlated with conventional features:  the 
higher fertility of more recently settled land (founding year, and output per unit of land), and 
access to more distant markets (railroad).  
 
Specification 3 illuminates a political economy factor that is often believed to be important, and 
paves the way to the next subsection.  Where inequality is high, and the franchise restricted as it 
was in Brazil, local elites may successfully limit public education, both to economize on 
redistributive transfers, and to reduce the mobility of workers (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000).  
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The local provision of a public good in a place with high inequality would be expected to be low 
if elites had captured the local political process.  But in specification 3 there is no effect from 
inequality (nor is there an effect using any of the other gini measures, not reported).  Nor does 
higher levels of farm product per capita appear to matter.  The key proximal determinant of local 
public goods provision in São Paulo was the share of immigrant land owners (Summerhill, in 
preparation).  Where there were higher proportions of immigrant owners, local elites decided to 
spend more on education.  Given that the immigrants were not enfranchised, this was most likely 
a “supply-side” phenomenon.  By offering higher levels of local public education, counties could 
recruit more immigrant workers, some of whom became farm owners. 
 
Political Inequality, Farm Inequality, and Development 
 
Acemoglu et al (2008) found that farm inequality in late nineteenth-century Colombia was 
positively related to development.  They stressed, however, that it was political inequality, rather 
than farm inequality, that mattered there for poorer developmental outcomes.  Ramcharan (2009) 
found that farm inequality and political inequality in the early twentieth-century US were related, 
and both were negatively associated with outlays on public education.  These results confirm the 
view that enfranchised elites would work to block redistribution as well as institutional changes 
that could dilute their control.  This political-capture-by-elites phenomenon figures prominently 
in various strands of the colonial origins literature, as well as more recent works (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2000a, 2000b).   
 
By 1900 Brazil was a caricature of an oligarchic Latin American polity based on political 
exclusion, patronage, and clientelism.  The 1881 electoral reform eliminated the strikingly broad 
electoral franchise that Brazil had for most of the nineteenth century, along with the system of 
two-stage elections.  The overthrow of the constitutional monarchy in 1889 reduced the franchise 
even further.  The Federal Constitution of 1891 guaranteed the right to vote to literate Brazilian 
males 21 years age and older, with only a few exceptions (Love, 1970).  The de facto franchise 
was far more exclusive.  Literacy had to be proven by writing name, age, residence, occupation, 
marital status, and parents’ names.  Local electoral boards, consisting of a judge and leading 
taxpayers, screened aspiring voters for literacy and other requirements.  Those who met the legal 
requirements still had hurdles to jump.  To register to vote required proof of two-months’ 
residency (conveniently waived if three property-owning citizens vouched in writing for the 
voter).  The opportunities for disenfranchisement, or highly selective enfranchisement by a 
partisan board, were rich.  Turnout in national elections was much lower than one would expect, 
even based on the de jure restrictions.   
 
As the story goes, state-level Republican parties held a monopoly on electoral outcomes within 
each state.  In São Paulo, between 1892 and 1930 the Republican party won all state-level offices 
with nearly 100 percent of the votes (Love, 1980).  The system was similarly rigged at the 
national level, where the Republican party machines of the richest (and most powerful) states 
preordained the president, often returning nearly unanimous, and highly manipulated, electoral 
results.  The consensus view is that local control of politics exercised by a wealthy, powerful and 
often armed class (coronelismo, or “colonel-ism”), which served to further enrich the wealthy, 
with little to no regard for the immiseration of the poor.   
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New evidence, however, suggest there were limits to how closely São Paulo’s politics hewed to 
this stereotype of oligarchic, rent-seeking control.  Political cleavages within the state’s elite 
were apparent during the “Old” Republic period, and grew over time (Font, 1990; Perissinotto, 
2003).  Woodard (2009) in particular shows that local politics were more varied and complex 
than the longstanding characterizations suggest.  There is no disputing that the franchise was 
tightly restricted in law and practice.  But it also varied by county, which is of particular interest 
given the hypotheses here.    
 
Four variables for county-level political inequality in the first decade of the twentieth century are 
constructed.  The first two are simple ratios: (1) the overall share of the population registered to 
vote; (2) the portion of registered voters made up by men whose principal occupation was 
agriculture.  The third variable measures the breadth of the effective franchise in terms of farm 
owners: 
 
A
RB =   
 
where R is the number of registered voters in the county who occupation is agriculture, and A is 
number of Brazilian (citizen) farm owners in the census of 1905.  A measure of B<1 indicates a 
county where even Brazilian citizen farm owners had trouble getting on the electoral rolls.  A 
measure of B>1 is a county where “agriculturalist” voters exceeded the number of Brazilian farm 
owners.   Counties for which B<1 are taken as having an especially restrictive franchise, while 
those for which B>1 had a more expansive franchise.  Where B>1—in effect, more 
democratic—one might expect better long-term outcomes.     
 
The fourth variable is an annual average of the number of newspapers in the county containing 
political content during the first decade of the twentieth century.  Where a local political boss 
held a firm grip on the voters, there would be little reason to have a political newspaper.  An 
example would be Xiririca, where there was no political newspaper, and which was seen a 
reliably “rotten borough.” A single political newspaper in a county might be seen as a 
mouthpiece for the local political boss, and perhaps a vehicle to discourage political entry by 
rivals. Alternatively, a single political newspaper might indicate a political upstart taking on an 
established machine.  In either case the level of political competition would be low.   Two or 
more political newspapers, however, would be unnecessary if a single coronel or local machine 
had firm control, and would be indicative of greater political competition.  
 
The descriptive statistics of Table 2 show that the franchise varied widely, from less than 1/3 of 
one percent of the population, to fully 10 percent (a figure consistent with the old, broader 
franchise of the imperial era).  The other variables also indicate a lack of uniformity in the rates 
of political inclusion and opportunities across the counties.  Franchise breadth  
 
The first insight from the data on political and economic inequality is that the correlations among 
them are low.  The principal exception is the franchise variable, which is positively correlated 
with economic inequality.   Table 8 presents the results from several different specifications that 
include political inequality as a control in the regressions of farm inequality on income.  Of the 
first three political variables, only the simple franchise ratio takes on statistical significance, but 
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has the “wrong’ sign—the greater the effective franchise in 1905, the worse the development 
outcomes in 2000.  Neither the agricultural intensity of the electorate, nor the breadth of the 
franchise, is significant.  Higher numbers of political newspapers are strongly associated with 
higher income.  However, inclusion of the Density variable (not reported) completely strips away 
the effect on political newspapers.  More prosperous areas were no doubt more literate, more 
urbanized, consumers had higher purchasing power, and those counties supported more 
newspapers in general, including newspapers with political content.   
 
Overall, political inequality at the county level in the early twentieth century is no more 
negatively associated with long-term outcomes than is economic inequality.  The non-negative 
impact of economic inequality remains robust to the inclusion of controls for political inequality.   
 
 
Colonial Institutions, Slavery, Inequality and Income: IV Results 
 
OLS estimates, like those above, suffer from a well-known and potentially serious weakness.  
Violations of the zero-conditional mean assumption will render the estimates inconsistent, such 
that the coefficients on inequality could be exaggerated, or even take on the wrong sign.  Two 
potential violations are of particular concern here.  The first is measurement error in the 
regressors.  Dichotomous variables of whether a county had a railroad or not, or a port, do not 
convey the quality of the port facilities, nor how cheap the unit cost of shipment was by rail.  
Census-based measures of farm activity also clearly suffer from survey error of various sources 
(ranging here from the overstatement of farm sizes, to the assignment of a single monetary value 
to a large group of farms).  A second potential violation of the zero-conditional mean assumption 
that is of concern is omitted variables.  If one or more variables that explain the outcome of 
interest are omitted, the OLS estimates will be both inconsistent and biased.   
 
To obtain estimates that are unbiased and consistent requires an instrumental variable. Properly 
instrumenting the endogenous regressor when there is omitted variable bias may even change the 
sign of the coefficient.  To insure that the positive coefficients on inequality produced by the 
OLS specifications are not the result of bias, several different instrumental variables are 
employed.  The instrument must be both uncorrelated with the error term, yet sufficiently 
correlated with the endogenous regressor.   
 
Inequality is widely seen as an outcome of other conditions.  Easterly (2009), building on 
historical insights from Engerman and Sokoloff, has stressed that growing conditions 
(topography, climate, and soil) favorable to the production of cash crops contribute to higher 
inequality.  To the extent that the share of land planted in coffee directly reveals intrinsic 
conditions that could cause farm wealth to concentrate, it would be useful as an instrument.  
Exploratory analysis reveals that share of cultivated land in coffee in 1905 is strongly and 
positively associated with all five measures of inequality.  But it is also endogenous, and likely 
violates the exclusion condition, ruling out its use.13  Several plausible instruments, including 
latitude and altitude, were rejected on empirical grounds. 
                                                 
13 Consider two parcels of land, of identical soil and growing conditions, equidistant from port.  
Let one be autarkic, and the other exposed to the market by virtue of a transport cost-reducing 
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Growing conditions are an obvious candidate for an instrument.  The farm census of 1904-1905 
meticulously characterized the predominant “type” of soil on each farm.  For two reasons this 
information is not exploited.  The vast variety of soil types reported, and the colloquial labels 
used for them, make it extremely difficulty to combine the soil conditions across farms into a 
county-wide indicator.  Second, contemporary understanding of morphology and pedogenesis, 
even when based on geological observation and soil sampling, was much less accurate than in 
recent decades.  The soil best suited for coffee, and generating the highest yields, was the “terra 
roxa” (reddish-purple earth).  Terra Roxa originated in diabase deposits, and presented high 
porosity and high iron content.  In the 1905 census terra roxa appears frequently in one guise or 
another.  Yet terra roxa was also widely misidentified by contemporaries, with “almost any soil 
with a reddish color being confidently and optimistically classified as terra roxa.” (James, 1932).  
The first recognizably modern and comprehensive soil surveys of São Paulo were completed 
only at midcentury (Setzer, 1949; Neto, et al., 1951).  Given that the quality and precision of 
information on soil conditions have only increased over the intervening six decades, the most 
modern soil data is the most informative, even for historical work.   
 
All of the 1905 inequality measures are highly correlated with the share of surface area 
consisting of two of the five major soil types present in São Paulo at the end of the twentieth 
century.  Moreover, there is a negative relationship between farm inequality in 1905 and the 
share of land classified as least suitable for agriculture (taking into account soil, declivity, 
topography, and drainage). There is also a strong negative relationship between inequality and 
the area made up of cambisols.  There is further a strong positive relationship between inequality 
and the area made up of latosols.  Experiments with over-identification tests in the IV framework 
used each of these as instruments (along with distance to coast as a second instrument).  The 
overall suitability of land for cultivation was a weak instrument.  The presence of cambisols 
exerted a direct impact on year 2000 income per capita, thus violating the exclusion restriction.  
The area made up of latosols, however, impacted income per capita solely through their effect on 
farm wealth inequality.  Latosols are generally viewed as relatively poor for cultivation, and thus 
frequently associated with livestock raising  However, they present the iron content (and 
associated reddish-purple color) typical of terra roxa, and are commonly (but not exclusively) 
used for coffee planting.    
 
In all of the IV specifications I use limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation 
rather than the generalized method of moments (2SLS) estimator.  With small samples, and 
possibly weak instruments, the bias of LIML is less than 2SLS.  The IV regressions in Table 11 
use the share of each CTU made up of latosols as an instrument for farm wealth inequality.  For 
each specification in the table presents the parameter estimate on the farm wealth gini, along 
with robust standard errors.  It also presents the F-statistic for the (joint) significance of the 
instrument(s) excluded from the structural model (note that this is not the same as first-stage F-
statistic for the joint significance of all of the variables, which can be much larger when 
covariates are included).   It further presents the Stock-Yogo critical value for the LIML 
                                                                                                                                                             
technology.  The latter will have a crop mix that includes more “commercial” crops, even though 
the two farms are otherwise identical.   
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estimator when the actual size of the 5% Wald test exceeds 15% (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 
2002).  An F-statistic less than this critical value suggests that the estimation may suffer from 
weak instruments, which would bias the parameter estimate on the inequality variable in the 
direction of the OLS estimate. 14   
 
The next rows present the Wald confidence intervals, and most importantly for instances where 
the instrument may be weak, the size-corrected confidence sets based on Moreira’s conditional 
approach (Moreira, 2003).  Assessing instruments for potential weakness using rules-of-thumb 
for the first-stage F-statistics (Staiger and Stock, 1997), and even the more precise Stock-Yogo 
criteria (2002), can lead to rejection of an instrument as weak when in fact it is valid and 
sufficiently “strong.” At the same time, F-statistics that suggest the instrument is not weak, when 
in practice it is, can be misleading (Cruz and Moreira, 2005).  The advantage of Moreira’s 
conditional approach is that the confidence sets from the conditional likelihood ratio test (along 
with critical values and p-values) are of the correct size, irrespective of the weakness of the 
instruments.  Moreover, if the instrument is in fact weak, it is visible in an appreciable difference 
between the “incorrect” Wald confidence interval and the correct conditional confidence set.   
 
The bottom panel presents the corresponding OLS estimates.  The first insight gleaned from 
these results is that for two of the specifications the IV estimates turn negative, whereas in the 
OLS estimates they were positive.  Yet while in four of the five OLS estimates the coefficient on 
farm inequality was significant, none of the IV estimates are significant, and both the Wald 
confidence intervals, along with the conditional confidence sets, span zero.  One could “blame” 
the covariates for having too high a correlation with inequality, thereby raising the standard error 
on its coefficient.  Yet in Specification 1 where there is no covariate the coefficient on inequality 
is also insignificant.  Omitted variables clearly biased the OLS estimates on inequality upward.  
Most importantly, instrumenting the inequality variable did not reveal a statistically significant 
negative relationship between inequality in 1905 and income per capita in 2000. 
 
Table 12 presents results that add an additional instrument, the distance from the municipality to 
the coast.  The statistics reported are as in the previous table, but can now include tests of over-
identifying restrictions, which help assess the validity of the instrumental variables strategy using 
soil type.  Instruments must be statistically independent of the disturbance process, and the 
exclusion restriction states that the instruments for inequality only affect income in 2000 
indirectly through their impact on inequality, rather than having any direct effect on income.  
The over-identification tests assume that one instrument is truly exogenous, and then test for the 
exogeneity of the other instrument.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with the disturbance term means that the over-identifying restriction is valid.  The 
p-values on the two over identification tests in the table that exceed 0.05 fail to reject the null, 
validating the restriction.  In addition to the over-identification tests reported in the table, 
specifications were run with the soil instrument included as a regressor in the second-stage 
                                                 
14 I use the F-statistic for the joint significance of the excluded instruments; if the minimum 
eigenvalue statistic were used instead, it would make it even easier to reject the null hypothesis 
of weak instruments, since it is larger than the F-statistic.  It is an open question as to which 
statistic to use, since the tests for weak instruments are predicated on homoskedastic errors, and 
the estimates here use the robust estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
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regression.  If the exclusion restriction was not valid, the parameter estimate on the instrument in 
the second stage would be significant.  In every case, the area in latosolos met the exclusion 
restriction, by both the over-identification tests, and by the inclusion of the latosolos variable on 
the right-hand side in the second stage. 
 
Just as in the first set of IV estimates using latosols as the single instrument, most of the results 
on farm wealth inequality based on two instruments lose all statistical significance compared to 
the OLS results.  Two of them actually turn negative.  Among the positive results, one remains 
statistically significant.  Adding aldeamento as a control causes the coefficient on inequality to 
become significant at the lowest conventional level.  All three of the positive IV coefficients 
exceed their OLS counterparts, including the one for Specification 1.  This suggests that in the 
OLS results the negative attenuation bias from measurement error may have exceeded the 
positive bias from omitted variables.  The covariates all remain positive and significant.  The IV 
estimates in these over-identified specifications differ from those in the just-identified versions.  
But in no case is inequality negatively and significantly related to year 2000 income per capita. 
 
To further test the sensitivity of the IV results to the choice of instrument for inequality, Table 13 
presents results that instrument inequality with the natural logarithm of winter rainfall.  
Elsewhere, farm inequality has been associated with weather conditions, and in particular their 
variability (Ramcharan, 2009).  Data on long-term weather patterns are available for São Paulo 
for the latter decades of the twentieth century at the county level.15  Despite the importance 
assigned to climate, neither the average temperature over a thirty-year period, nor the standard 
deviation of temperature, are correlated with the measures of inequality from 1905.  Nor were 
the annual average levels of rainfall, or the standard deviation of rainfall over several decades.  
While overall rainfall levels were not correlated with inequality, seasonal patterns could work 
quite differently.  James (1932) noted that winter (dry season) rainfall levels were negatively 
related to coffee yields.  This is a climate feature that could concentrate farm land and wealth, 
via its effects on crop mix and the minimum efficient scale of production.  The natural logarithm 
of average winter (dry-season) rainfall levels from 1960 to 1990 is correlated with the share of 
cultivated land in coffee in 1905, and with all of the inequality measures.  Specification 1 with 
no covariates gives a result that positive but insignificant.  It is also smaller than the OLS 
version, suggesting the positive bias that is typical of OLS.   The addition of covariates risks 
creating a weak instruments problem, since the F-statistic falls below the Stock-Yogo critical 
value.  This makes the conditional confidence sets particularly important.  Overall the results 
using this instrument are much like those obtained when the area in latosols is the instrument.  Of 
the few negative parameter estimates on the farm wealth variable, none have confidence intervals 
that are exclusively to the left of zero.  There is no evidence that farm wealth inequality in 1905 
was negatively related to income in 2000. 
 
Finally, I test the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the inequality indicator.  The OLS 
results of the reduced-form sections above relied principally on the overall farm wealth gini as 
                                                 
15 Establishing long-term weather patterns conventionally requires at least 30 years of data.  The 
available weather data for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offer coverage of less 
than 25 percent of the state’s counties, so I use the more comprehensive data from the later 
period.   
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the dependent variable.  Table 14 looks at the relationship between the overall wealth gini and 
income per capita in 2000 with IV regression.  For overall farm wealth, the only available 
instrument that performs adequately is distance to the coast.  In three of the five IV specifications 
(estimated again with LIML) the coefficient on inequality is positive, and on two of these with 
covariates it is strongly positive and statistically significant, even more so than in the OLS 
results.  Only in Specifications 3 and 5 are the coefficients on inequality negative, and neither is 
statistically significant.  The conditional confidence sets give no reason to believe that the 
coefficients on inequality in these two specifications are reliably negative.   
 
The upshot of the IV regressions for income per capita in 2000, using two different inequality 
variables, and three distinct instruments for inequality, is that they reveal not a single 
statistically-significant negative coefficient on inequality.  There is no evidence that 1905 land 
inequality had a persistent or negative impact on long term development.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper tests the hypotheses that colonial institutions, slavery, and inequality reduced income 
and undermined development.  The analysis uses actual historical measures of these variables, 
rather than proxies, including an original set of measures of farm inequality in São Paulo in 
1905.   
 
Institutions created in the early colonial era did have an impact on long run development.  The 
agenda-setting papers by Engerman and Sokoloff, and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, have 
stressed the importance of colonial conditions for development.  The findings here show that in 
São Paulo a previously-unexplored local colonial institution mattered.  The insight is different in 
flavor from the previous literature.  The Jesuit-run, indigenously-populated aldeamentos of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had both “extractive” and “settler” elements.  Many actual 
colonial institutions (rather than those inferred ex post) quite likely exhibited a similarly 
ambiguous character.  The net effect of the aldeamentos on long-term development was positive.  
Counties that had begun as an aldeamento in the 1500s had higher levels of per capita income in 
2000.   
 
The intensity of slavery, measured near its likely peak in 1872 during the upsurge of export 
agriculture in São Paulo, failed to account for variations in long-term income across the states.  
In reduced-form estimates the effect of slavery on income was actually positive.  The addition of 
controls that proxy for the developmental prospects of each area eliminated the positive impact 
of slavery on development.  The absence of a negative effect of “peak” slavery on income runs 
counter to the Engerman-Sokoloff thesis on the impact of slavery on development.  Evidence for 
Brazil as a whole, however, suggests that the intensity of late colonial slavery is associated with 
lower levels of development.  This possibility cannot be assessed yet within the state of São 
Paulo in the absence of reliable, county-level estimates of the slave population.   
 
Most strikingly, farm inequality has no negative impact on long-term income.  An original set of 
inequality indicators based on some fifty-thousand farms is constructed to test the hypothesis that 
inequality undermined development.  OLS estimates range from no effect of inequality on 
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growth, to a positive effect of inequality on growth.  Inequality is unlikely to be exogenous.  The 
IV approach, using instruments that are both conceptually and statistically appropriate, did not 
alter key finding obtained from the OLS regressions:  there is no negative relationship between 
inequality in 1905 and income per capita in 2000.  The estimated relationship between the two 
varies, from strongly positive, to insignificantly different from zero.  Adding a second well-
performing instrument to soil type as an instrument made it possible to conduct over-
identification tests, confirming that the effect of soil type ran solely through inequality, with no 
direct impact on income per capita in 2000.   
 
Inequality, when it is not persistent, does not necessarily indicate dire circumstances that favor 
later underdevelopment.  Nor is it the case that unfavorable outcomes can be pinned 
mechanically on earlier inequality.  The within-state result here using an original set of measures 
of historical inequality runs counter to an array of other findings, whether across countries (e.g., 
Easterly, 2007), or within Brazil (e.g., Wegenast, 2010).  The principal implication of this very 
different result is that inequality in São Paulo was not only not persistent, but also unlikely 
“structural.”  The high mobility of factors, especially people, both around the globe and within 
the state, helped insure that inequality would not persist, despite a legacy of slavery, colonialism, 
and political oligarchy.  Early twentieth-century farm inequality reflected an equilibrium level of 
market-based inequality that was part of the overall process of economic change, one that in no 
way worked against long-term growth or development.      
 
 
 26 
 Appendix I:  Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Early Twentieth-Century Variables 
 
Note: most variables are averages of the available annual figures from the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  The cases where data were reported annually (infant mortality, by way of 
example) were few.  For some variables there was only one year in which the information was 
available.  All monetary variables were adjusted to mid-decade real prices using the Catão 
wholesale price index. 
 
Inequality Variables (crude farm gini, farm area gini, farm wealth gini, overall farm 
 land gini, overall farm wealth gini):  as detailed in the text. 
Colonial Aldeamento: as detailed in the text. 
Founding Year/Colonial Founding: the earliest year that any population center of the 1905 
county (not necessarily the county itself) was assigned administrative “status” by a higher level 
of government.  Settlement in almost all instances clearly preceded this date.  As such, in most 
instances it is a lagging indicator that people had begun to concentrate in that location.  Sources:  
Forjaz, 1941; São Paulo, Divisão Administrativa, 1908. 
Railroad: dichotomous variable coded 1 if the county had a railroad in its boundaries in 1908.  
Sources: Brazil, Questionários; Cunha, Estudo Descriptivo;  Silva, Reforma das Tarifas; São 
Paulo, Secretaria de Agricultura, Relatório, 1899. 
Port: dichotomous variable coded 1 if the county had a coastal port in 1908.  Source: Brazil, 
Questionários. 
River Navigation:  Nearly every county reported several rivers, but most of these were not 
suitable for navigation over economically significant distances.  The variable is coded 1 if the 
county was reported as having significant commercial river navigation in 1908.  Sources:  Brazil, 
Questionários; Companhia Paulista, Relatório, 1900-1910. 
Total Farm Area:  area reported held in farms in 1905.  Sources:  São Paulo, Estatística 
Agrícola; São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura, Relatório, 1906. 
Population:  total population in 1907.  This is the basis for all per capita variables from the early 
twentieth century.  Source:  Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1908-1912.  The farm census of 1905 
was not a population census.  The state Anuário Estatístico reported, in conspicuously round 
numbers, admittedly conjectural estimates of population by county in 1905.  For several counties 
the 1907 the figures from the national Anuário Estatístico differed greatly from those estimated 
by the state for 1905.  The state Anuário Estatístico in 1909 again reported round-numbered 
figures for each county, which in several instances were quite different still.  One way to try and 
resolve the conflicting figures is to interpolate 1900 and 1920 census figures.  This provides yet a 
different set of estimates for many counties. Linear (or any other type of) interpolation is 
probably a poor approximation to actual population figures in many counties, given the very 
rapid immigration underway between 1900 and 1920.  The 1907 estimates were part of a 
nationwide effort by contemporaries to establish inter-census county-level population figures, 
and are used here. 
Total Cultivated Area: area under cultivation in 1905.  Sources: São Paulo, Estatística 
Agrícola; São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura,Relatório, 1906. 
Cultivated Share: Total Cultivated Area divided by Total Farm Area in 1905.  
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Land use by crop: area planted in principal crops in 1905. Sources: São Paulo, Estatística 
Agrícola; São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura, Relatório, 1906. 
Coffee Share of Cultivated Area: Coffee Area divided by Total Cultivated Area in 1905 
Coffee Trees: number of coffee trees reported in 1905.  Sources: São Paulo, Estatística 
Agrícola; São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura,Relatório, 1906. 
Coffee Output: quantity of coffee produced in 1905. Sources: São Paulo, Estatística Agrícola; 
São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura, Relatório, 1906. 
Tree Yield: Coffee crop divided by number of coffee trees in 1905 
Land Yield:  Coffee crop divided by area planted in 1905 
Farm Value:  Total value of farms, in milréis.  Sources: São Paulo, Estatística Agrícola; São 
Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura, Relatório, 1906. 
Share of Owners who were Brazilian: number of Brazilian farm owners in 1905 divided by 
total farm owners.  Sources: São Paulo, Estatística Agrícola; São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios 
da Agricultura, Relatório, 1906. 
Share of Brazilian Owners: number of Brazilian farm owners divided by total farm owners. 
Sources: São Paulo, Estatística Agrícola; São Paulo. Secretaria dos Negócios da Agricultura, 
Relatório, 1906. 
Local Public Education Expenditures: annual average expenditures on public education, 1901-
1910.  Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various years. 
Total Municipal Expenditures:  annual average municipal expenditures net of debt service, 
1901-1910. Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various years.  
Total Municipal Revenues:  real annual average municipal revenues, net of loans and previous 
year’s budget surplus, 1901-1910. Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São 
Paulo, various years. 
Coffee Tax Share:  real annual average revenues from tax on coffee cultivation divided by Total 
Municipal Revenues, 1901-1910. Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São 
Paulo, various years. 
Industrial Capital:  capital of manufacturing firms in 1907.  Source: Centro Industrial do Brasil, 
O Brasil, Vol. 3, 1909. 
Political Newspapers:  annual average number of newspapers carrying political content.  
Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various years.  
State Voters: voters enrolled for state elections, 1903 and 1904.  Sources: São Paulo, Anuário 
Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various years. 
Share Agricultural Voters:  share of total electors listed as agriculturalists on state electoral 
rolls, 1903 and 1904. Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various 
years. 
Breadth of Franchise:  Agricultural electors in 1903 and 1904 divided by Brazilian farm owners 
in 1905. 
Output Mix Variables:  shares of the value of various farm crops the total value of agricultural 
output in 1905 and 1906; Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, 
various years. 
Land share Variables:  share of cultivated land in each major crop in 1905. 
Gross Farm Product: sum of agricultural output, livestock output, and extractive output.  
Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various years. 
Agriculture Share:  value of crop output divided by Gross Farm Product.  Sources: São Paulo, 
Anuário Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, various years. 
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Slave Share: share of the population in 1872 consisting of slaves.  
Density: population in 1907 divided by total area of the CTU 
Banking Assets: total assets of banks based in the county.  Foreign banks, which were all 
located in the municipio of São Paulo, are included.  Sources: São Paulo, Anuário Estatístico do 
Estado de São Paulo, various years. 
 
Year 2000 Variables 
 
Note:  county-level data from 1990s and year 2000 are aggregated up to the CTU based on 1905 
counties.  Values for each county are aggregated in an intuitive way.  Income per capita, HDIs, 
average years of schooling, and literacy rates are population-share weighted.   Farm land gini 
coefficients are farm area-share weighted across counties in the CTU.  Distance to coast, rainfall, 
temperature, altitude, and latitude are unweighted averages.   
 
Farm Gini Coefficients, 1995: data assembled by EMBRAPA 
Soil type:  data assembled by EMBRAPA 
Seasonal and Annual rainfall and temperature: estimates from the Climate Research Unit, 
 University of East Anglia, from 1960 to 1990, provided by Eustáquio Reis of IPEA.  
For all other late twentieth-century and early twenty-first century variables the sources are: 
  
www.ibge.gov.br 
www.seade.gov.br 
www.ipeadata.gov.br 
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Appendix II: the Construction of Comparable Territorial Units 
(CTU), 1905-2000 
 
Before the long-run developmental implications of early twentieth-century farm inequality could 
be assessed, aided by the rich set of contemporaneous controls, São Paulo’s counties 
(municípios) from 2000 had to be matched to their counterparts in 1905, and recombined into 
comparable territorial units to correspond as closely as possible to their original boundaries.  The 
nature and extent of the task is revealed by the maps of São Paulo’s counties in 1900 and 1997 in 
Figure 2.  From 171 counties in 1905, the state subdivided into nearly 650 counties.   The 
creation of new counties by the fragmentation of old ones was especially pronounced in the 
large, sparsely-settled, distant western regions of the state at the start of the century. 
 
The construction of the year 2000 CTUs that match the 1905 counties was done manually.  Each 
year-2000 county was traced back to its 1905 origins using sources that detailed legislation and 
decrees dictating the administrative subdivision counties over the century. The main source was 
Forjaz’s running compilations of the progressive “dismemberment” of counties beginning in 
1929 (São Paulo, 1941).  The most recent version of the equivalent source was current through 
1993 (São Paulo, 1995).  Only a few counties were created between 1993 and 2000, and these 
could be traced at the state government’s statistical agency website for historical demographic 
statistics (www.seade.gov.br).  At points it was useful to consult the national statistical agency’s 
on-line reports of each county’s origins (www.ibge.gov.br), although not all counties were 
found.  None of the sources was found to be without error, as revealed by frequent cross checks, 
with the most reliable being Forjaz 
 
There were two main complications in matching counties from 2000 to counties in 1905.  The 
first was when the name of the county changed (which was usually unrelated to subdivision).  By 
way of example, and independent of any later fragmentation, the county of Patrocínio de Santa 
Izabel was abruptly renamed Igaratá; Similarly, Remédios do Tieté became Anhembí.  Name 
changes made matching even more complicated when a new, and entirely different county, took 
up the retired name of an old one (with the county of Bocaina being the most bedeviling case).  
The second complicating feature was the subordination of old counties to new ones, followed at 
some later date by their re-emancipation.  The best indicator that an “old” county which had been 
subsumed was being recreated was the reappearance of the old county name, though this was not 
always true, as the Bocaina example illustrates.  
 
Tracing the counties by name and legislation solved the matching problem even in the most 
difficult cases.  Nonetheless, the area of the year 2000 comparable units and 1905 counties might 
not be the same, even if all of the subdivided counties are properly matched to their 1905 
forebears.  The following consistency check was applied to the CTUs: if the matching and 
recombination were done properly, total farm area in the 1905 county should be no larger than 
the overall area of the comparable territorial unit in 2000.  This was checked using the modern 
figures on county size, and the 1905 farm census figures on farm area.  The check revealed that 
twenty-five of the 170 comparable territorial units in 2000 were smaller than the total farmland 
in their 1905 counties, violating the upper consistency bound.   
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There are several likely sources of these violations.  It is important to note that while counties 
comprising the CTUs may be “matched” correctly, the areas of those counties may not be 
perfectly aligned.  In 1905, boundaries and areas of many counties remained uncertain or even 
unknown.  The three far western counties of Baurú, São José do Rio Preto, and Campos Novos 
de Paranapanema (Paulista) subdivided into more than 200 counties total by 2000.  The eastern-
most reaches of these counties comprised the western frontier in 1905.  Only in the early 
twentieth century did survey-explorers sort out many of the basic geographical features of the 
paulista west, and even then were attacked by Indians while conducting their fieldwork. 
  
Given the nearly complete absence of land surveying in 1905, the possibility of shifting county 
boundaries (as opposed to merely subdivision), and census survey error, I ignored all violations 
of the upper consistency bound in which the difference between 1905 county total farm area and 
the year 2000 CTU area was twenty percent or less.  This left ten CTUs for which the size 
discrepancy was greater than twenty percent.  The territorial and administrative history of every 
constituent county of these ten CTUs was scrutinized in an effort to locate the source of the 
discrepancy.  In a couple of cases the most likely source was indeed the problem of having been 
subsumed into another county, and then later separated again.  In these instances the re-separated 
counties likely had less territory than they possessed before they had been absorbed.  The 1905 
Villa Bella, which is 49% larger than its year 2000 CTU, is a case in point.  In 1934 it was 
reduced to the status of a district within the neighboring São Sebastião.  Later the same year it 
was separated anew as a county, but of unknown size.  The likely result is that its CTU in 2000 is 
too small (and that of São Sebastião is now too “large”).  The counties of Yporanga and Espírito 
Santo do Turvo also fall into this category.  Without knowing precisely which share of each 1905 
area should be reassigned to a different county, no further adjustment can be made.   
 
A few cases simply lack any explanation altogether on the basis of the sources.  For example, 
Bananal is 93 percent over size, and Silveiras some 150 percent larger in 1905 than its CTU.  
Such a difference, however, cannot be a result of failing to properly match the newer counties to 
their 1905 counterparts.  The records do not reveal even a single administrative division between 
1905 and 2000 for these counties.  This leaves two alternatives for explaining the difference in 
area between the 1905 county and the 2000 CTU.  Either the 1905 assessments of farm sizes 
were grossly off, or the county lost territory between 1905 and 2000 that is not noted in official 
sources.  In either case, this becomes one source of unavoidable measurement error. 
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Appendix III: Measuring Farm Inequality 
 
Gini coefficients for the distribution of farm land and farm wealth in 1905 were calculated by:  
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Five different gini coefficients were calculated, four of which are based on the farm-level census 
data for 165 of 171 counties:  the farm land gini, the overall farm land gini, the farm wealth gini, 
and the overall farm wealth gini.  The fifth measure—the crude farm gini-- used the distribution 
of farms across discrete size categories reported by the state secretary of agriculture.  The 
number of farms for each size category was reported for all 171 counties, and the gini was 
calculated under the assumption that the mid-point of each category was the mean size of the 
farms in the category (for farms greater than 1000 alqueires in size, the mean was taken to be 
1000 alqueires).  The overall ginis added to left tail of the Lorenz curve the estimated number of 
landless families in the municipality, as detailed in the text.  This increased the gini coefficients 
considerably. 
 
The farm census reported the size and value of farms in a straightforward way for most of the 
165 counties that were detailed.  For a subset of counties, however, omissions and arbitrary 
aggregations complicated the construction of gini coefficients.  The purpose of this appendix is 
to highlight some of these, and describe the measures taken to arrive at indicators of inequality.     
 
Since an owner might have several farms, care is taken in all of the counties to combine multiple 
farms under the same owner into a single unit.  Names that occur frequently complicate a 
simplified reliance on owner name.  To combine farms, the census had to provide some 
information indicating that more than one farm belonged to the same person.  The most typical 
cases arose when an owner and farm were listed, and then immediately following for the next 
farm the census noted the owner as “o mesmo” (“the same”).  Sometimes farms were listed 
under the owner’s name, followed by “herança” (estate), or “herdeiros” (heirs). This indicated 
the farm was in probate, or had otherwise not been divided among heirs.  Such a farm was 
treated as one unit without any effort to allocate shares of the farms across the potential heirs. 
 
Some anomalies were idiosyncratic.  For two counties (Caraguatatuba, and São Sebastião), farm 
size was reported in the census, but not the farm values.  The soil type was listed uniformly as 
“good” across all of the farms, and the census reported a constant unit value of land for all farms 
in each county.  For these two counties the inequality statistics for farm area, and farm wealth, 
are necessarily identical.  For the county of Belém do Descalvado many of the farm values were 
missing.  However, most farms reported a unit value of land, as well as the farm size.  The 
product of these provided estimates of the value of each farm.  The county of Conceição de 
Itanhaem was yet another anomaly.  It had fewer than 100 farms, every one of which produced 
only manioc.  For most farms the value of the property was reported, but for many farms no area 
was reported, and the farm land ginis and farm wealth ginis diverge accordingly.   
 
Beyond these three idiosyncratic cases, two types of anomalies stand out in the census: (1) for 
some counties the census delegates were particularly inconsistent in their approach to reporting 
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farm data, (2) the census compilers in turn were not consistent in how they dealt with such 
discrepancies across counties.   
 
One of the most significant challenges arose from counties in the number of farm owners what 
different from the number of farms.  In some instances this was authentic in-family ownership.  
For example, in the county of Avaré three men with the same surname, and three minors, owned 
a single farm. But in several counties there were numerous instances of an area comprising a 
single farm, usually sizeable, listed with multiple proprietors of different surnames.  It is not 
made explicit whether these were tenants (something higher than a worker), or whether the 
census taker had simply lumped together the areas of several farms into one unit because they 
could not secure sufficient detail about the holdings.  The presumption here is that listing in the 
census as a proprietor indicates ownership. 
 
The problem presented by farms listed with numerous owners was complicated by the 
inconsistent treatment of such cases by the census’ statisticians across counties.  For example, in 
Avaré, 387 separate proprietors were enumerated by the census.  A number of them were 
grouped together as holding a single unit of land, such that only 228 separate areas were 
enumerated as farms, in the hands of the 387 proprietors.  Yet in the Agriculture Secretary’s 
summary by size categories, Avaré is shown having 225 farms.  The census officials clearly did 
not allocate the area or values of these farms across the individual proprietors. 
 
The census’ compilers took a very different approach, however, to Santo Antonio da Boa Vista.  
There, 325 proprietors were enumerated in the census, but with only 71 farms.  Nonetheless, in 
the Agriculture Secretary’s summary, the county had 325 farms (equal to the number of 
proprietors in the census).  In order to have arrived at such a result census officials clearly did 
assign the areas of the 71 farms in the census across the 325 farm owners.     
 
Whether or not the contemporary analysts assigned land areas to proprietors correctly in their 
statistical manipulations is one concern.  I assume that they did so, based on the best information, 
both statistical and qualitative, that available to them.  A different concern is whether the staffers 
working on the census were consistent in their treatment, county to county.  The examples of 
Avaré and Santo Antonio da Boa Vista show that they were not, and this is a potential source of 
error that makes comparability of the gini coefficients across these counties difficult.  
 
Little purpose is served by detailing the features for every county that exhibited this grouping 
problem.16  The approach taken here for counties in which there were “grouped” farm owners is 
to allocate the grouped farms in equal shares to all the listed proprietors, before calculating the 
gini coefficients. These were then checked against the crude farm gini coefficients calculated 
from the size categories of the Agriculture Secretary’s report for 1906 for consistency. 
 
                                                 
16 In addition to Avaré and Santo Antônio da Boa Vista, this problem was especially salient in 
the cases of Baurú, São Pedro do Turvo, and São Miguel Archanjo.   
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Figure 1.  State of São Paulo 
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Figure 2.  Evolution of municipalities in São Paulo, 1900-2000 
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Figure 3.  Inequality in 1905: Farm Land and Farm Wealth Gini Coefficients 
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Figure 4.  Colonial Aldeamentos and per capita Income in 2000 
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Figure 5.  Overall Farm Wealth Inequality in 1905 and per capita Income in 2000 
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Figure 6.  Farm Wealth Inequality in 1905 and per capita Income 2000 
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Figure 7.  Slavery and Growth: All Brazil, 1780-2000 
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Table 1.  Farm Gini Coefficients, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics of 1905 Inequality Measures 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Crude Farm Gini  170 0.630918 0.10317 0.168971 0.795514 
Farm Land Gini 164 0.677151 0.104658 0.22112 0.92738 
Farm Wealth Gini 164 0.696343 0.113105 0.28406 0.97292 
Overall Farm Area Gini 164 0.958974 0.050434 0.600467 0.998215 
Overall Farm Wealth Gini 164 0.962191 0.046284 0.681941 0.999467 
 
 
Panel B:  1905 Inequality Correlations 
 
  
Crude 
Farm 
Gini 
Farm Area 
Gini 
Farm 
Wealth 
Gini  
Overall 
Farm Area 
Gini 
Overall 
Farm 
Wealth 
Gini 
Crude Farm Gini 1         
Farm Land Gini 0.7923 1       
Farm Wealth Gini 0.6411 0.7562 1     
Overall Farm Area Gini 0.3173 0.2782 0.2223 1   
Overall Farm Wealth Gini 0.273 0.2765 0.3322 0.9235 1 
 
 
Panel C: Correlation Between Farm Land Ginis, 1905 and 1995 
 
  
Farm 
Gini 
1905 
Farm 
Gini 1995 
Farm Gini 1905 1   
Farm Gini 1995 0.0895 1 
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Table 2A.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log per capita Income (2000) 170 5.698 0.284 4.791 6.908 
Colonial Founding 170 0.306 0.462 0.000 1.000 
Aldeamento 170 0.065 0.247 0.000 1.000 
Distance to Coast 170 198.238 150.592 0.027 1137.948 
Slave Share 1872 170 0.160 0.086 0.039 0.531 
Founding Year 170 1822.735 79.662 1545.000 1897.000 
Density 1907 170 23.416 20.851 0.365 189.559 
Port 170 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000 
River Navigation 170 0.129 0.337 0.000 1.000 
Railroad 170 0.665 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Gross Farm Product per capita 170 111.497 81.125 1.423 425.599 
 Gross Farm Land Productivity 170 98.279 102.771 3.599 535.952 
Industrial Capital per capita 170 19.288 89.788 0.000 894.010 
Bank Assets per capita 170 5.801 60.587 0.000 784.656 
Outlays on Public Education per capita 156 0.165 0.197 0.000 0.851 
Brazilian Share of Farm Owners 170 0.845 0.147 0.386 1.000 
Voters per capita 170 0.036 0.017 0.003 0.101 
Agriculturalist Share of Voters 170 0.665 0.166 0.047 0.974 
Franchise Breadth 170 1.821 1.401 0.148 8.125 
Political Newspapers 170 0.847 2.078 0.000 25.000 
HDI Income (2000) 170 0.722 0.045 0.573 0.839 
HDI Education (2000) 170 0.865 0.032 0.775 0.933 
HDI Life Expectancy (2000) 170 0.776 0.039 0.600 0.853 
Municipal Development Index (2000) 170 0.696 0.057 0.542 0.856 
Average Years of Schooling for Adults (2000) 170 5.650 0.864 3.300 7.747 
Literacy Rate, 15 Years and Older  (2000) 170 90.414 2.990 79.354 95.417 
Physicians per thoursand (2000) 170 0.728 0.709 0.000 4.566 
Infant Mortality Rate 170 0.274 0.139 0.067 0.911 
Share of county in Latosols 170 0.534 0.412 0.000 1.000 
log Winter Rain 170 4.566 0.233 4.302 5.589 
 
Table 2B.  Correlations Among Key Variables 
 
 lny Aldeamento 
Distance 
to Coast 
Slave 
Share 
1872 
Founding 
Year 
Density 
1907 Railroad 
Gross 
Farm 
Product 
per capita 
 Gross 
Farm Land 
Productivity 
Industrial 
Capital 
per 
capita 
Bank 
Assets per 
capita 
Outlays 
on Public 
Education 
per capita 
Brazilian 
Share of 
Farm 
Owners 
Voters 
per 
capita
lny 1                           
Aldeamento 0.2103 1                         
Distance to 
Coast 0.1189 -0.2427 1                       
Slave Share 
1872 0.2741 -0.1884 -0.0292 1                     
Founding Year -0.274 -0.3098 0.4459 -0.06 1                   
Density 1907 0.5305 0.1602 -0.188 0.2545 -0.2386 1                 
Railroad 0.5195 0.0643 0.2281 0.3755 0.0605 0.3772 1               
Gross Farm 
Product per 
capita 0.1615 -0.261 0.5036 0.1881 0.3966 -0.0346 0.3689 1             
Farm Land 
Productivity 0.2852 -0.1621 0.2052 0.2239 0.2659 0.3192 0.3356 0.6417 1           
Industrial 
Capital per 
capita 0.1852 0.3411 -0.0949 0.0597 -0.1357 0.1125 0.128 -0.1453 -0.0911 1         
Bank Assets 
per capita 0.348 0.2995 -0.0704 -0.0394 -0.2496 0.6291 0.0679 -0.0804 -0.0063 0.1772 1       
Outlays on 
Public 
Education per 
capita 0.3673 -0.1747 0.3405 0.2853 0.1151 0.168 0.3055 0.3815 0.3102 -0.0646 -0.0434 1     
Brazilian Share 
of Farm 
Owners -0.4759 0.0839 -0.2699 -0.36 -0.181 -0.3195 -0.5034 -0.5102 -0.4812 0.0048 -0.0675 -0.5286 1   
Voters per 
capita -0.2389 -0.1458 -0.0115 -0.0673 -0.0856 -0.2703 -0.1665 -0.0124 -0.2094 -0.1255 -0.0653 -0.1973 0.2578 
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Table 3: Colonial Institutions, Slavery and Income 
 
 
Dependent Variable: lny (2000) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Colonial Founding 0.0914 0.1328** 0.0983*  
 (0.0466) (0.0482) (0.0470)  
Colonial Aldeamento 0.2326* 0.2808** 0.3665*** 0.2673** 
 (0.1013) (0.1010) (0.0993) (0.1003) 
Distance to Coast  0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0006*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Slave Share 1872   0.9535*** 0.9382*** 
   (0.2429) (0.2324) 
Founding Year     -0.0011*** 
    (0.0003) 
Constant 5.6587*** 5.5630*** 5.4111*** 7.5105*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0432) (0.0567) (0.5193) 
N 170 170 170 170 
r2 0.0605 0.1008 0.1776 0.2305 
F 5.38 6.2009 8.9081 12.3597 
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
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Table 4.  Colonial  Institutions, Slavery, Inequality, and Income 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable lny 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Colonial Aldeamento 0.2766** 0.2795** 0.2992** 0.3128*** 0.3100*** 
 (0.0978) (0.0914) (0.1055) (0.0798) (0.0805) 
Distance to Coast 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Slave Share 1872 0.9330** 0.8949** 0.8540** 0.7660** 0.7292* 
 (0.3122) (0.3142) (0.3083) (0.2900) (0.2846) 
Founding Year 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Crude Farm Gini 0.15     
 (0.2285)     
Farm Area Gini  0.3771    
  (0.2257)    
Farm Wealth Gini   0.3809   
   (0.1935)   
Overall Farm Area Gini    1.6002*** 
    (0.4011)  
Overall Farm Wealth Gini     1.9257*** 
     (0.5469) 
Constant 7.5122*** 7.3405*** 7.3813*** 6.2743*** 6.0503*** 
 (0.5700) (0.5454) (0.5534) (0.5885) (0.6821) 
N 170 170 170 170 170 
r2 0.2492 0.2642 0.2652 0.325 0.3397 
F 5.216 5.7016 6.6079 7.9091 9.48 
Robust cluster standard 
errors in parentheses      
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
 
 48 
Table 5: Colonial Institutions, Slavery, Inequality, and Selected Controls 
  
Dependent Variable:  lny 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Colonial Aldeamento 0.2639* 0.1689* 0.1601* 0.2085* 0.2118* 
 (0.1108) (0.0807) (0.0712) (0.1011) (0.1015) 
Distance to Coast 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0004** 0.0003* 0.0003* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Slave Share 1872 0.6865* 0.4325* 0.167 0.2029 0.1856 
 (0.2651) (0.2172) (0.2224) (0.2718) (0.2537) 
Founding Year  
-
0.0013*** 
-
0.0011*** 
-
0.0009*** 
-
0.0012*** 
-
0.0012*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Overall Farm Wealth Gini 1.7814** 1.2369** 1.0503* 1.3555** 1.2031** 
 (0.5611) (0.4616) (0.4354) (0.4541) (0.4444) 
Density 1907  0.0057*** 0.0046***   
  (0.0008) (0.0007)   
Port   0.1980* 0.1716 0.1562 
   (0.0900) (0.0995) (0.0971) 
River Navigation   0.076 0.0585 0.0387 
   (0.0435) (0.0457) (0.0467) 
Railroad 1908   0.1820*** 0.2456*** 0.2283*** 
   (0.0393) (0.0390) (0.0392) 
Gross Farm Product per 
capita    0.0001  
    (0.0003)  
Farm Land productivity     0.0004* 
     (0.0002) 
Constant 6.1730*** 6.1629*** 5.9906*** 6.2199*** 6.5054*** 
 (0.6651) (0.5454) (0.5511) (0.6201) (0.6150) 
N 170 170 170 170 170 
r2 0.3109 0.4547 0.5328 0.4485 0.464 
F 10.0564 26.6263 23.456 11.3311 12.2544 
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 6.  Colonial Institutions, Slavery, Inequality, and Additional Controls 
 
Dependent Variable: lny  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Colonial Aldeamento 0.2154* 0.1232  0.1365  0.2138  0.2041* 
 (0.0969) (0.0759) (0.0755) (0.1188) (0.0961) 
Distance to Coast 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0002  0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Slave Share 1872 0.2297  0.2473  0.2564  0.1253  0.0489  
 (0.2607) (0.2639) (0.2607) (0.2565) (0.2395) 
Founding Year  -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Overall Farm Wealth 
Gini 1.3814** 1.1799** 1.2066** 1.3115** 1.1032** 
 (0.4610) (0.4170) (0.4233) (0.4769) (0.4079) 
Port 0.1870  0.1934* 0.2023* 0.0000  0.0000  
 (0.0970) (0.0921) (0.0922) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
River Navigation 0.0628  0.0584  0.0606  0.0631  0.0540  
 (0.0451) (0.0446) (0.0445) (0.0455) (0.0444) 
Railroad 1908 0.2406*** 0.2488*** 0.2412*** 0.2391*** 0.1827*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0425) (0.0384) 
Industrial Capital per 
capita 0.0004   0.0003    
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)   
Bank Assets per capita  0.0010*** 0.0010***   
  (0.0001) (0.0001)   
Outlays on Public 
Education per capita    0.3075***  
    (0.0847)  
Brazilian Share of 
Farm Owners     -0.5599*** 
     (0.1283) 
Constant 6.0197*** 6.0102*** 5.9154*** 6.2597*** 7.2284*** 
 (0.6163) (0.5599) (0.5774) (0.6211) (0.6529) 
N 170 170 170 156 170 
r2 0.4596  0.4887  0.4947  0.4961  0.5006  
F 11.7613  179.6364  165.8935  14.3248  14.1046  
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 7.  Slavery and Development, All Brazil, circa 1780 to 2000 
 
 Dependent Variable: lny 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Slave Share 1872 2.4635* 2.276 2.8092* -0.3523 
 (0.8914) (1.3007) (1.0350) (0.6100) 
Density 1780  0.0251 -0.0087 0.0637* 
  (0.0740) (0.0621) (0.0274) 
Slave Share 1819   -0.9898 -0.5192* 
   (0.7544) (0.2256) 
North/Northeast state    -0.7547*** 
    (0.0751) 
Constant 5.0359*** 5.0442*** 5.3033*** 5.9591*** 
 (0.1172) (0.1233) (0.2626) (0.0913) 
N 19 19 19 19 
r2 0.2231 0.2267 0.3218 0.9117 
F 7.6379 8.1741 5.5376 68.1203 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
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Table 8.  Political Inequality Controls 
 
Dependent Variable: lny 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Colonial Aldeamento 0.1326 0.1614 0.1102 0.163 0.1056 
 (0.0986) (0.0962) (0.0943) (0.0985) (0.0696) 
Distance to Coast 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Founding Year  -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0008** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Overall Farm Wealth 
Gini 1.3286** 1.3658** 1.2705** 1.5812** 1.1743** 
 (0.4597) (0.4315) (0.4368) (0.4859) (0.4149) 
Port 0.1709 0.1422 0.147 0.1596 0.1862* 
 (0.0931) (0.1016) (0.0966) (0.0982) (0.0913) 
River Navigation 0.0484 0.0608 0.0501 0.0555 0.0621 
 (0.0451) (0.0456) (0.0442) (0.0462) (0.0450) 
Railroad 1908 0.2575*** 0.2558*** 0.2457*** 0.2722*** 0.2434*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0361) (0.0363) 
Voters per capita -2.8131**  -2.9705**   
 (0.9583)  (0.9585)   
Agriculturalist Share of 
Voters  -0.098 -0.1078   
  (0.0699) (0.0562)   
Franchise Breadth    -0.019  
    (0.0140)  
Political Newspapers     0.0367*** 
     (0.0047) 
Constant 6.5526*** 6.3780*** 6.7469*** 6.0577*** 5.7271*** 
 (0.6005) (0.5867) (0.5912) (0.6230) (0.5647) 
N 170 170 170 170 170 
r2 0.4703 0.4584 0.4872 0.4513 0.4976 
F 13.2253 13.2376 12.0961 13.1756 38.6841 
Robust cluster standard errors in 
parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 9:  Inequality and Long-term Outcomes 
Variables HDI Income 
  HDI 
Education 
  HDI Life 
Expectancy 
 Municipal 
Developmen
t Index 
 Average 
Years of 
Schooling 
for Adults 
 Literacy 
Rate 15 
years and 
older 
 Physicians 
per capita 
Overall Farm Wealth 
Gini 0.2369*** 0.1062 0.1446* 0.2363* 3.6269* 11.7217* 2.9229** 
 (0.0620) (0.0565) (0.0582) (0.1058) (1.5677) (5.3811) (1.0160) 
Colonial Aldeamento 0.0234** 0.0249** -0.0126 0.0264* 0.4919* 1.5585* -0.145 
 (0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0110) (0.2021) (0.7753) (0.1642) 
Founding Year -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0 0 -0.0046*** -0.0113*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0005) 
Slave share 1872 0.0299 0.0337 -0.0019 0.0064 0.4501 1.2399 -0.0296 
 (0.0481) (0.0291) (0.0595) (0.0703) (0.7251) (3.2153) (0.6515) 
Railroad 1908 0.0406*** 0.0297*** 0.0184** 0.0532*** 0.7645*** 2.7147*** 0.4941*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0085) (0.1336) (0.5146) (0.0939) 
Constant 0.7468*** 0.9480*** 0.6099*** 0.4290** 9.9589*** 97.6788*** 2.3003* 
 (0.0785) (0.0639) (0.0722) (0.1261) (1.6408) (5.9157) (1.1460) 
N 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
r2 0.4055 0.4269 0.1239 0.3 0.4625 0.3737 0.2355 
F 18.5684 20.6788 6.8813 15.5072 30.2509 22.6118 15.1565 
Robust cluster standard errors in 
parentheses       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
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Table 10.  Inequality and Contemporary Outcomes 
 
 Dependent Variables: 
Variables  
Average Infant 
Mortality Rate, 
1900-1910 
Log Average Real 
Gross Farm 
Product per 
capita, 1900-1910 
Average Real 
Local per capita 
Public Education 
Outlays, 1900-
1910 
Overall Farm Wealth 
Gini 0.273 -1.2907 0.0297 
 (0.2465) (1.8977) (0.1835) 
Colonial Aldeamento -0.0308 -0.7599** -0.0988* 
 (0.0319) (0.2560) (0.0493) 
Founding Year 0.0005*** 0.0042*** -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0002) 
Railroad 1908 -0.0396 0.3048* 0.0198 
 (0.0271) (0.1313) (0.0305) 
Brazilian Share of Farm 
Owners 0.1886***  -0.5845*** 
 (0.0494)  (0.1612) 
Gross Farm Land 
Productivity -0.0003** 0.0031***  
 (0.0001) (0.0006)  
Gross Farm Product per 
capita   0.0003 
   (0.0003) 
Constant -0.9320** -2.5306 0.8422* 
 (0.3318) (2.2076) (0.3660) 
N 170 170 156 
r2 0.2027 0.4956 0.3112 
F 5.6225 31.7904 8.8279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
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Table 11.  IV Estimates with Farm Wealth Gini as Endogenous Regressor and Latosols 
Instrument 
 
Dependent Variable lny 
 
Panel A: IV Second Stage      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm Wealth Gini 0.6501 1.3396 -0.6498 0.9548 -0.0261 
 (0.7053) (0.8789) (0.8226) (0.6648) (0.8308) 
Colonial Aldeamento  0.3851**    
  (0.1446)    
Railroad 1908   0.3568***   
   (0.0753)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0016***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5471*** 
     (0.1142) 
Constant 5.2457*** 4.7415*** 5.9122*** 5.0244*** 5.6279*** 
 (0.5015) (0.6283) (0.5362) (0.4719) (0.5739) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0205 0.0093 0.2018 0.1071 0.1325 
F test on instrument(s) 13.71 9.36 8.63 13.44 7.54 
Stock-Yogo 15% Maximal Size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 
Wald 95% Confidence Interval [-0.732, 2.032] [-0.383, 3.062] [-2.262, 0.962] [-0.348, 2.258] [-1.655, 1.602] 
Conditional Confidence Set [ -.759,  2.219] [-.269,  3.835] [  -3.253,  .976] [-.300,  2.578] [ -2.336,  1.817] 
      
Panel B:  OLS      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm Wealth Gini 0.4253* 0.5945** 0.0057 0.4408* 0.3043 
 (0.1693) (0.1891) (0.1643) (0.1697) (0.1630) 
Colonial Aldeamento  0.2970**    
  (0.1114)    
Railroad 1908   0.3062***   
   (0.0425)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0016***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5090*** 
     (0.1018) 
Constant 5.4020*** 5.2652*** 5.4902*** 5.3818*** 5.4051*** 
 (0.1192) (0.1351) (0.1101) (0.1186) (0.1116) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0284 0.0907 0.2622 0.1486 0.1482 
F 6.3148 6.2676 29.0873 339.0961 16.7049 
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
 
 55 
Table 12. IV Estimates with Farm Wealth Gini as the Endogenous Regressor, and Share of 
Total Area in Latosols and Distance to Coast as Instruments 
      
Dependent Variable lny 
Panel A: IV Second Stage      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm Wealth Gini 0.7433 1.4732* -0.2935 0.9961 -0.0489 
 (0.5565) (0.7011) (0.6388) (0.5195) (0.6430) 
Aldeamento  0.4009**    
  (0.1347)    
Railroad   0.3293***   
   (0.0670)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0016***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5497*** 
     (0.1023) 
Constant 5.1809*** 4.6476*** 5.6828*** 4.9957*** 5.6432*** 
 (0.3997) (0.5054) (0.4172) (0.3726) (0.4485) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0125 . 0.2496 0.1002 0.1303 
F 11.01 8.2 7.82 10.79 5.72 
Over ID test: A-R chi square 0.059051 0.070651 0.564196 0.012689 0.00256 
     p-value 0.808 0.7904 0.4526 0.9103 0.9596 
Over ID test: Basmann F 0.058357 0.069405 0.554239 0.012465 0.002511 
     p-value 0.8094 0.7925 0.4576 0.9112 0.9601 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 15% 
Maximal Size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 
Wald 95% Confidence Interval [-0.347, 1.834] [0.099, 2.847] [-1.545, 0.959] [-0.022, 2.014] [-1.309, 1.211] 
Conditional Confidence Set [-0.660,  2.379] [-0.102,  4.086] [-2.248, 1.310] [-0.269,  2.674] [-2.543, 1.883] 
     p-value 0.3796 0.0696 0.6765 0.1444 0.9962 
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Panel B:  OLS      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm Wealth Gini 0.4253* 0.5945** 0.0057 0.4408* 0.3043 
 (0.1693) (0.1891) (0.1643) (0.1697) (0.1630) 
Aldeamento  0.2970**    
  (0.1114)    
Railroad   0.3062***   
   (0.0425)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0016***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5090*** 
     (0.1018) 
Constant 5.4020*** 5.2652*** 5.4902*** 5.3818*** 5.4051*** 
 (0.1192) (0.1351) (0.1101) (0.1186) (0.1116) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0284 0.0907 0.2622 0.1486 0.1482 
F 6.3148 6.2676 29.0873 339.0961 16.7049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 13.  IV Estimates with Farm Wealth Gini as the Endogenous Regressor, and log 
Winter Rain as Instrument 
 
Dependent Variable lny 
Panel A: IV Second Stage      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm Wealth Gini 0.3659 1.1931 -1.0207 0.5634 -0.0367 
 (0.6258) (0.9579) (0.8124) (0.6218) (0.5490) 
Colonial Aldeamento  0.3678*    
  (0.1535)    
Railroad 1908   0.3855***   
   (0.0831)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0016***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5483*** 
     (0.1077) 
Constant 5.4433*** 4.8445*** 6.1509*** 5.2965*** 5.6350*** 
 (0.4417) (0.6804) (0.5232) (0.4375) (0.3792) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0279 0.0382 0.1141 0.1463 0.1315 
F 9.85 6.62 6.89 9.68 7.53 
Stock-Yogo 15% Maximal Size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 
Wald 95% Confidence Interval [-0.861, 1.592] [-0.684, 3.071] [-2.613, 0.572] [-0.655, 1.782] [-1.113, 1.039] 
Conditional Confidence Set [-0.882, 1.584] [-0.253, 3.158] [-3.239, .267] [-0.568, 1.755] [-1.471, 1.198] 
      
Panel B:  OLS      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm Wealth Gini 0.4253* 0.5945** 0.0057 0.4408* 0.3043 
 (0.1693) (0.1891) (0.1643) (0.1697) (0.1630) 
Colonial Aldeamento  0.2970**    
  (0.1114)    
Railroad 1908   0.3062***   
   (0.0425)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0016***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5090*** 
     (0.1018) 
Constant 5.4020*** 5.2652*** 5.4902*** 5.3818*** 5.4051*** 
 (0.1192) (0.1351) (0.1101) (0.1186) (0.1116) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0284 0.0907 0.2622 0.1486 0.1482 
F 6.3148 6.2676 29.0873 339.0961 16.7049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 14.  IV Estimates with Overall Farm Wealth as the Endogenous Regressor, and 
Distance to the Coast as the Instrument 
 
Dependent Variable lny 
Panel A: IV Second Stage      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overall Farm Wealth Gini 1.8886 3.5032* -0.0159 2.3134* -0.159 
 (1.1898) (1.4498) (1.4873) (1.1214) (1.3510) 
Colonial Aldeamento  0.3853**    
  (0.1229)    
Railroad 1908   0.3071***   
   (0.0673)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0015***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.5538*** 
     (0.1118) 
Constant 3.8856*** 2.3116 5.5087*** 3.4694** 5.7611*** 
 (1.1519) (1.4064) (1.3989) (1.0848) (1.2938) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0928 0.1135 0.2614 0.1861 0.1216 
F 12.1 9.5 8.29 12.18 8.26 
Stock-Yogo 15% Maximal Size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 
Wald 95% Confidence Interval [-0.443, 4.221] [0.662, 6.345] [-2.931, 2.899] [0.115, 4.511] [-2.807, 2.489] 
Conditional Confidence Set [-1.245, 5.1108] [.143,  8.305] [-4.308, 3.275] [-.434, 5.493] [-5.964, 3.509] 
      
Panel B:  OLS      
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overall Farm Wealth Gini 1.7568** 2.1229** 0.9406* 1.6447** 1.3703** 
 (0.5253) (0.6415) (0.4393) (0.5043) (0.5153) 
Colonial Aldeamento  0.3228**    
  (0.1088)    
Railroad 1908   0.2765***   
   (0.0400)   
Bank Assets per capita    0.0015***  
    (0.0001)  
Outlays on Public Education per 
capita     0.4600*** 
     (0.1023) 
Constant 4.0121*** 3.6400*** 4.6114*** 4.1108*** 4.3099*** 
 (0.5072) (0.6225) (0.4195) (0.4879) (0.4911) 
N 170 170 170 170 156 
r2 0.0933 0.1682 0.2864 0.1996 0.189 
F 11.1855 6.6508 29.8479 384.2106 19.3584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
 
 
